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INTRODUCTION 
 Over the last twenty years several network industries that evolved historically as 
either private or state-owned regulated vertically integrated monopolies have been 
privatized, restructured, and some vertical segments deregulated.  These industries 
include telecommunications, natural gas, electric power, and railroads.  The reform 
program typically involves the vertical separation (ownership or functional) of potentially 
competitive segments, which are gradually deregulated, from remaining vertical 
segments that are assumed to have natural monopoly characteristics and continue to be 
subject to price, network access, service quality and entry regulations.  In several 
countries, an important part of the reform agenda has included the introduction of 
“incentive regulation” mechanisms for the remaining regulated segments as an alternative 
to traditional “cost of service” or “rate of return” regulation.  The expectation was that 
incentive regulation mechanisms would provide more powerful incentives for regulated 
firms to reduce costs, improve service quality in a cost effective way, stimulate (or at 
least not impede) the introduction of new products and services, and stimulate efficient 
investment in and pricing of access to regulated infrastructure services.   
                                                 
1 Prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Economic Regulation,  
September 9-10, 2005.  I have benefited from extensive comments provided by David Sappington.  I am 
grateful for research support from the .MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. 
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 Although much of the research on the “liberalization” of these sectors has focused 
on the evolution of the potentially competitive segments that have been deregulated, the 
performance of the remaining regulated segments, and in particular the performance of 
new incentive regulation mechanisms, is also of considerable economic importance.  
These regulated segments often represent a significant fraction of the total retail price for  
services paid for by consumers (prices for competitive plus regulated services).  
Moreover, the performance of the regulated segments can have important effects on the 
performance of the competitive segments when the regulated segments provide the 
infrastructure platform upon which the competitive segments rely (e.g. the electric 
transmission and distribution networks).  Accordingly, the welfare consequences of these 
industry restructuring and deregulation initiatives depends on the performance of both the 
competitive and the regulated segments of these industries. 
  As the industry liberalization initiatives were gaining steam in Europe, Latin 
America, Australia, New Zealand and North America during the late 1980s and the 
1990s, theoretical research on the properties of alternative incentive regulation 
mechanisms developed quite rapidly as well. However, the relationship between 
theoretical developments and applications of incentive regulation theory in practice has 
not been examined extensively.  In this paper I provide an overview of the theoretical and 
conceptual foundations of incentive regulation theory, discuss some practical 
implementation issues, examine how incentive mechanisms have been structured and 
applied to electric distribution and transmission networks, primarily in the UK where the 
application of these mechanisms is most advanced, review the limited available empirical 
analysis of the performance of incentive regulation mechanisms applied to electric 
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distribution and transmission networks, and draw some conclusions about the 
relationships between incentive regulation theory and it application.   
As I will discuss, the implementation of incentive regulation concepts is more 
complex and more challenging than may first meet the eye.  Even apparently simple 
mechanisms like price caps (e.g. RPI – x regulation) are fairly complicated to implement 
in practice, are often imbedded in a more extensive portfolio of incentive regulation 
schemes, and depart in potentially important ways from the assumptions upon which 
related theoretical analyses have been based.  Moreover, the sound implementation of 
incentive regulation mechanisms depends in part on information gathering, auditing, and 
accounting institutions that are commonly associated with traditional cost of service or 
rate of return regulation.  These institutions are especially important for developing sound 
approaches to the treatment of capital expenditures, to develop benchmark for operating 
costs, to implement ratchets and resets of prices, to apply incentive regulation 
mechanisms to service quality attributes, and to deter gaming of incentive regulation 
mechanisms that have ratchets of one type or another.    
The failure to understand the role of this regulatory infrastructure, especially as it 
relates to data collection, accounting rules, reporting and auditing standards can 
significantly undermine the effectiveness of incentive regulation in practice.  In the UK, 
for example, the initial failure of regulators to fully understand the need for a uniform 
system of accounts as part of the foundation for implementing incentive regulation 
mechanisms has placed limitations on their effectiveness and led to gaming by regulated 
firms (e.g. capitalizing operating costs to take advantage of asymmetries in the treatment 
of operating and capital costs).  The lack of a good standard accounting and reporting 
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system made more difficult the UK electricity regulator’s efforts to remove distortions 
caused by the periodicity of regulatory reviews.  As a result, the electricity regulator in 
the UK has now found it necessary to strengthen and standardize cost accounting and 
reporting protocols to allow for better incentive regulation (OFGEM 2004f). 
 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
a. Overview 
 The traditional textbook theories of optimal pricing for regulated firms 
characterized by subadditive costs and a budget constraint (e.g marginal cost pricing, 
Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, non-linear pricing, etc.) assume that regulators are completely 
informed about the technology, costs and consumer demand attributes facing the firms 
they regulate and can somehow impose cost-minimization obligations on regulated firms 
(e.g. Boiteux 1960 (1951), 1971 (1956), Braeutigam (1989)).2  The focus is then on 
second-best pricing given defined cost functions, demand attributes and budget balance 
constraints, not on incentives to minimize costs or improve other dimensions of firm 
performance.  Fully informed regulators clearly do not exist in reality.  Regulators have 
imperfect information about the cost and service quality opportunities and the attributes 
of the demand for services that the regulated firm faces.  Moreover, the regulated firm 
generally has more information about these attributes than does the regulator or third 
parties which have an interest in the outcome of regulatory decisions.  Accordingly, the 
regulated firm may use its information advantage strategically in the regulatory process to 
increase its profits or to pursue other managerial goals, to the disadvantage of consumers 
                                                 
2 This characterization is a little unfair since the development of much of this theoretical work was 
associated with economists in public enterprises who not only worked on optimal pricing but also 
developed methods for optimizing costs, reliability and service quality in a public enterprise context.  
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(Owen and Braeutigam 1978, Laffont and Tirole 1993, Chapter 1).  These problems may 
be further exacerbated if the regulated firm can “capture” the regulatory agency and 
induce it to give more weight to its interests (Posner 1974; McCubbins 1985; Spiller 
1990; Laffont and Tirole 1993, Chapter 5).  Alternatively, other interest groups may be 
able to “capture” the regulator and, in the presence of long-lived sunk investments, 
engage in “regulatory holdups” or expropriation of the regulated firm’s assets. Higher 
levels of government, such as the courts and the legislature, also have imperfect 
information about both the regulator and the regulated firm and can monitor their 
behavior only imperfectly (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987). 
The evolution of “traditional” regulatory practices in the U.S. actually has 
reflected efforts to mitigate the information disadvantages that regulators confront, as 
well as broader issues of regulatory capture and opportunities for monitoring by other 
levels of government, consumers and other interest groups.  These institutions and 
practices are reflected in: laws and regulations that require firms to adhere to a uniform 
system of accounts, give regulators access to the books and records of regulated firms 
and the right to request additional information on a case by case basis; auditing 
requirements, staff resources to evaluate this information, transparency requirements such 
as public hearings and written decisions, ex parte communications rules; opportunities for 
third parties to participate in regulatory proceedings to (in theory)3 assist the regulatory 
agency in developing better information and reducing its regulatory disadvantage; and 
appeals court review, and legislative oversight processes.  In addition, since regulation is 
a repeated game, regulators (as well as legislators and appeals courts) can learn about the 
                                                 
3 Of course, third parties may have an incentive to inject inaccurate information into the regulatory process 
as well. 
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firm’s attributes as they observe its responses to regulatory decisions over time and, as a 
result, the regulated firm naturally develops a reputation for the credibility of its claims 
and the information that it uses to support them.   
However, although the development of U.S. regulatory practice focused on 
improving the information available to regulators, the regulatory mechanisms adopted 
typically did not utilize this information nearly as effectively as they could have.  While 
U.S. regulatory practice differs significantly from the way it is often characterized, and 
during long periods of time provided incentives to control costs (Joskow 1974, 1989), 
formal incentive regulation mechanism where historically used infrequently in the U.S., 
Canada, Spain and other countries with private rather than state owned regulated network 
industries.  Perhaps regulatory practice evolved this way due to the absence of a sound 
theoretical incentive regulation framework to apply in practice.   
Beginning in the 1980s, theoretical research on incentive regulation rapidly 
evolved to confront directly imperfect and asymmetric information problems and related 
contracting constraints, regulatory credibility issues, dynamic considerations, regulatory 
capture, and other issues that regulators have been trying to respond to for decades but in 
the absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework to guide them.  This theoretical 
framework is reasonably mature and can help regulators deal with these challenges much 
more directly and effectively (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 
1994; Armstrong and Sappington 2003).   
 Consider the simplest characterization of the nature of the regulator’s information 
disadvantages and its potential implications.  A firm’s cost opportunities may be high or 
low based on inherent attributes of its technical production opportunities, exogenous 
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input cost variations over time and space, inherent differences in the costs of serving 
locations with different attributes (e.g. urban or rural), etc.  While the regulator may not 
know the firm’s true cost opportunities she will typically have some information about 
their probability distribution.  The regulator’s imperfect information can be summarized 
by a probability distribution defined over a range of possible cost opportunities between 
some upper and lower bound within which the regulated firm’s actual cost opportunities 
lie.  Second, the firm’s actual realized costs or expenditures will not only depend on its 
underlying cost opportunities but also on the behavioral decisions made by managers to 
exploit these cost opportunities.  Managers may exert varying levels of effort to get more 
(or less) out of the cost opportunities that the firm has available to it.  The greater the 
managerial effort the lower will be the firm’s costs, other things equal.  However, 
exerting more managerial effort imposes costs on managers and on society.  Other things 
equal, managers will prefer to exert less effort than more to increase their own 
satisfaction, but less effort will lead to higher costs and more “x-inefficiency.”  
Unfortunately, the regulator cannot observe managerial effort directly and may be 
uncertain about its quality and its impacts on actual costs. 
 The uncertainties the regulator faces about the firm’s inherent cost opportunities 
and managerial effort gives the regulated firm a strategic advantage.  The firm would like 
to convince the regulator that it is a “higher cost” firm than it actually is, in the belief that 
the regulator will then set higher prices for the services it provides as it satisfies the 
firm’s long-run viability constraint (firm participation or budget-balance constraint), 
increasing the regulated firm’s profits, creating dead-weight losses from (second-best) 
prices that are two high, and allowing the firm to capture surplus from consumers.  Thus, 
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the social welfare maximizing regulator faces a potential adverse selection problem as it 
seeks to distinguish between firms with high cost opportunities and firms with low cost 
opportunities while adhering to a firm viability or participation constraint that must be 
satisfied if the firm turns out to have either high or low cost opportunities. 
 The uncertainties that the regulator faces about the quantity and impact of 
managerial effort creates another potential problem.  Since the regulator typically has or 
can obtain good information about the regulated firm’s actual costs (i.e. it’s actual 
expenditures), at least in the aggregate, one approach to dealing with the adverse 
selection problem outlined above would simply be to set (or reset after a year) prices to a 
level equal to the firm’s realized costs ex post.  This would solve the adverse selection 
problem since the regulator’s information disadvantage would be resolved by auditing the 
firm’s costs.4 This is the standard characterization of “cost of service” regulation.  
However, if the opportunity to earn rents reduces managerial effort and less managerial 
effort increases the firm’s costs, this kind of “cost plus” regulation may lead management 
to exert too little effort to control costs, increasing the realized costs above their efficient 
levels.  If the “rat doesn’t smell the cheese and sometimes get a bit of it to eat” he may 
play golf rather than working hard to achieve efficiencies for the regulated firm.  Thus, 
the regulator faces a potential moral hazard problem associated with variations in 
managerial effort in response to regulatory incentives (Laffont and Tirole 1986; Baron 
and Besanko 1987b). 
 Faced with these information disadvantages, the social welfare maximizing 
regulator will seek a regulatory mechanism that takes the social costs of adverse selection 
                                                 
4 Of course, the auditing of costs may not be perfect and in a multiproduct context the allocation of 
accounting costs between different products is likely to reflect some arbitrary joint cost allocation 
decisions.  
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and moral hazard into account, subject to the firm participation or budget-balance 
constraint that it faces, balancing the costs associated with adverse selection and the costs 
associated with moral hazard.  The regulator may also take actions that reduce her 
information disadvantages by, for example, increasing the quality of the information that 
the regulator has about the firm’s cost opportunities.   
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 10-19), to illuminate the issues at stake 
we can think of two polar case regulatory mechanisms that might be applied to a 
monopoly firm producing a single product.  The first regulatory mechanism involves 
setting a fixed price ex ante that the regulated firm will be permitted to charge going 
forward (i.e. effectively forever).  Alternatively, we can think of this as a pricing formula 
that starts with a particular price and then adjusts this price for exogenous changes in 
input price indices and other exogenous indices of cost drivers (forever).  This regulatory 
mechanism can be characterized as a fixed price regulatory contract or, in a dynamic 
setting, a price cap regulatory mechanism where prices adjust based on exogenous input 
price and performance benchmarks.  There are two important attributes of this type of 
regulatory mechanism.  Because prices are fixed (or vary based only on exogenous 
indices of cost drivers) and do not respond to changes in managerial effort or ex post cost 
realization , the firm and its managers are the residual claimants on production cost 
reductions and the costs of increases in managerial effort (and vice versa).  That is, the 
firm and its managers have the highest powered incentives fully to exploit their cost 
opportunities by exerting the optimal amount of effort (Brennan 1989; Cabral and 
Riordan 1989; Isaac 1989; Sibley 1989; Kwoka 1993).  Accordingly, this mechanism 
provides optimal incentives for inducing managerial effort and eliminates the costs 
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associated with managerial moral hazard.  However, because the regulator must adhere to 
a firm participation or viability constraint, when there is uncertainty about the regulated 
firm’s cost opportunities the regulator will have to set a relatively high fixed price (or 
dynamic price cap) to ensure that if the firm is indeed inherently high cost, the prices 
under the fixed price contract or price cap will be high enough to cover the firm’s 
(efficient) realized costs.  Accordingly, while a fixed price mechanism may deal well 
with the potential moral hazard problem by providing high powered incentives for cost 
reduction, it is potentially very poor at “rent extraction” for the benefit of consumers and 
society, potentially leaving a lot of rent to the firm due to the regulator’s uncertainties 
about the firm’s inherent costs and its need to adhere to the firm viability or participation 
constraint.  Thus, while a fixed price type incentive mechanism solves the moral hazard 
problem it incurs the full costs of adverse selection. 
 At the other extreme, the regulator could implement a “cost of service” contract or 
regulatory mechanism where the firm is assured that it will be compensated for all of the 
costs of production that it actually incurs.  Assume for now that this is a credible 
commitment --- there is no ex post renegotiation --- and that audits of the expenditures 
the firm has incurred are accurate.  When the firm produces it will then reveal whether it 
is a high cost or a low cost firm to the regulator.  Since the regulator compensates the 
firm for all of its costs, there is no “rent” left to the firm as excess profits.  This solves the 
adverse selection problem.  However, this kind of cost of service recovery mechanism 
does not provide any incentives for the management to exert optimal (any) effort.  If the 
firm’s profitability is not sensitive to managerial effort, the managers will exert the 
minimum effort that they can get away with.  While there are no “excess profits” left on 
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the table since revenues are equal to the actual costs the firm incurs, consumers are now 
paying higher prices than they would have to pay if the firm were better managed and 
some rent were left with the firm and its managers.  Indeed, it is this kind of managerial 
slack and associated x-inefficiencies that most policymakers have in mind when they 
discuss the “inefficiencies” associated with regulated firms.  Thus, the adverse selection 
problem can be solved in this way, but the costs associated with moral hazard are fully 
realized. 
 Accordingly, these two polar case regulatory mechanisms each have both positive 
and negative attributes.  One is good at providing incentives for managerial efficiency 
and cost minimization, but it is bad at extracting the benefits of the lower costs for 
consumers.  The other is good at rent extraction but leads to inefficiencies due to moral 
hazard resulting from suboptimal managerial effort.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the optimal 
regulatory mechanism (in a second best sense) will lie somewhere between these two 
extremes.  In general, it will have the form of a profit sharing contract or a sliding scale 
regulatory mechanism where the price that the regulated firm can charge is partially 
responsive to changes in realized costs and partially fixed ex ante (Schmalensee 1989, 
Lyon 1996).  More generally, by offering a menu of cost-contingent regulatory contracts 
with different cost sharing provisions, the regulatory can do even better than if it offers 
only a single profit sharing contract (Laffont and Tirole 1993).  The basic idea here is to 
make it profitable for a firm with low cost opportunities to choose a relatively high 
powered incentive scheme and a firm with high cost opportunities a relatively low-
powered scheme.  Some managerial inefficiencies are incurred if the firm turns out to 
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have high cost opportunities, but these costs are balanced by reducing the rent left to the 
firm if it turns out to have low cost opportunities. 
 Consider the following simple example that illustrates the value of offering a 
menu of regulatory contracts to the regulated firm.5  Assume that there are two options, a 
fixed price contract or a cost-of-service contract.  By offering this menu the regulator can 
present a more demanding fixed priced contract because the cost-of-service contract 
ensures that the firm viability constraint will not be violated.  If the fixed price contract is 
too demanding the firm will choose the cost-of-service contract.  However, if the firm is 
potentially a very low-cost supplier and chooses the fixed price contract more rents will 
be conveyed to consumers.   
We can capture the nature of the range of options in the following fashion.  
Consider a general formulation of a regulatory process in which the firm’s allowed 
revenues “R” are determined based on a fixed component “a” and a second component 
that is contingent on the firm’s realized costs “C” and where “b” is the sharing parameter 
that defines the responsiveness of the firm’s revenues to realized costs. 
 R =  a + (1-b)C   
Under a fixed price contract or price cap regulation: 
 a = C* where C* is the regulator’s assessment of the “efficient” costs of the 
 highest cost type and 
 b = 1 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to David Sappington for providing this example. 
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Under pure cost of service regulation where the regulator can observe the firm’s 
expenditures but not evaluate their efficiency:6 
 a = 0 
 b = 0 
Under profit sharing contract or sliding scale regulation (Performance Based Regulaion) 
 0 < b < 1 
 0 < a < C* 
The challenges then are to find the optimal performance based mechanism given 
the information structure faced by the regulator and for the regulator to find ways to 
reduce its information disadvantages vis a vis the regulated firm and to use the additional 
information effectively.  Laffont-Tirole show that it is optimal for the regulator to offer a 
menu of contracts with different combinations of a and b that meet certain conditions 
driven by the firm participation constraint and an incentive compatibility constraint that 
leads firms with low cost opportunities to choose a high powered scheme (b is closer to 1 
and a is closer to the efficient cost level for a  firm with low cost opportunities) and firms 
with high cost opportunities to choose a lower powered incentive scheme (a and b are 
closer to zero).  The lower powered scheme is offered to satisfy the firm participation 
constraint, sacrificing some costs associated with moral hazard, in order to reduce the 
rents that must be left to the high cost as it is induced to exert the optimal amount of 
managerial effort while satisfying the firm viability constraint if it turns out to be a high 
cost opportunity firm. (So far, this discussion has ignored quality issues.  Clearly if a 
regulatory mechanism focuses only on reducing costs and ignores quality it will lead to 
                                                 
6 This is not a particularly accurate characterization of cost of service regulation in practice in the U.S., but 
it has become the common characterization of it, especially among those who had no experience with it 
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1986). 
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firm to provide too little quality.  This is a classic problem with pure fixed price or price 
cap mechanisms and will be discussed further below.) 
 The incentive regulation literature is not a substitute for the older literature on 
optimal pricing for natural monopolies subject to a budget constraint, but rather a 
complement to it.  This can be seen most clearly in the framework developed by Laffont 
and Tirole where the availability of government transfers creates a dichotomy or 
separation between optimal pricing and optimal incentives (Laffont-Tirole 1993, Chapter 
2).  All of the basic optimal pricing results continue to be applied alongside the 
application of optimal incentive schemes.  More generally, however, pricing and 
incentives cannot be so easily separated and their effects are likely to be interdependent.  
Some mechanisms can provide both good pricing and performance (cost, quality) 
incentives, but typically, the desire to get prices as well as performance incentives right 
creates another constraint that moves us further from first-best outcomes.  Legal, 
political, bureaucratic and other constraints may also be quite important in practice. 
 b.  Incentive Regulation Theory Typology 
 The many papers that have contributed to the development of incentive regulation 
theory reflect a wide range of assumptions about the nature of the information possessed 
by the regulator and the firm about costs, cost reducing managerial effort, demand and 
product quality, the attributes of the regulatory instruments available to the regulator, the 
risk preferences of the firm, regulatory capture by interest groups, regulatory 
commitment, flexibility, and other dynamic considerations.  These alternative sets of 
assumption can be applied in both a single or multiproduct context.  One strand of the 
literature initially focused primarily on adverse selection problems motivated by the 
 15
assumption that regulators could not observe a firm’s costs and ignoring the role of 
managerial effort (Baron-Meyerson 1982; Lewis and Sappington 1988a, 1988b). Another 
strand of the literature focused on both adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
motivated by the assumption that regulators could observe a firm’s realized cost ex post, 
had information about the probability distribution of a firm’s cost ex ante, and that 
managerial effort did affect costs but that this effort was not observable by the regulator 
(Laffont and Tirole (1986)).  Over time, these approaches have evolved to cover a similar 
range of assumptions about these basic information and behavioral conditions and lead to 
qualitatively similar conclusions.  Armstrong and Sappington (2003) provide a 
comprehensive and thoughtful review and synthesis of this entire literature and I refer 
readers interested in a very detailed treatment of the full range of specifications of 
incentive regulation problems to their paper.  Here I will simply lay out a “typology” of 
how these issues have been developed in the literature.   
 What are the regulator’s objectives?  Much of the literature assumes that the 
regulator seeks to maximize a social welfare function that reflects the goal of limiting the 
rents that are transferred from consumers and/or taxpayers to the firm’s owners and 
managers subject to a firm participation or breakeven constraint.  Armstrong and 
Sappington (2003) articulate this by specifying an objective function W = S + αR where 
W is expected social welfare, S equals expected consumers’ (including consumers as 
taxpayers) surplus,  R equals the expected rents earned by the owners and managers of 
the firm (over and above what is needed to compensate them for the total costs of 
production and the disutility of managerial effort to satisfy the firm viability or 
participation constraint), and where α < 1 implies that the regulator places more weight 
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on consumers surplus than on rents earned by the firm.  That is, the regulator seeks to 
extract rent from the firm for the benefit of consumers, subject as always to a firm 
participation or break-even constraint.  In addition, W will be reduced if excessive rents 
are left to the firm since this will require higher (second-best) prices and greater 
allocative inefficiency.   
Laffont and Tirole (1988, 1993, 2000)) create a social benefit from reducing the 
rents left to the firm in a different way.  In their basic model, consumer welfare and the 
welfare of the owners and managers of the firm are generally weighted equally.  
However, one of the instruments available to the regulator is the provision of transfer 
payments from the government to the firm which affect the rents earned by the firm.  
These transfer payments come out of the government’s budget and carry a social cost 
resulting from the inefficiencies of the tax system used to raise these revenues.  Thus, for 
every dollar of transfer payments given to the firm to increase its rent, effectively (1+λ) 
dollars of taxes must be raised, where λ reflects the inefficiency of the tax system.  
Accordingly, by reducing the transfers to the firm over and above what is required to 
compensate it for its efficient production costs and the associated managerial disutility of 
effort, welfare can be increased.   This set-up also leads to a nice dichotomy between 
incentive mechanisms and the setting of second-best prices for the services sold by the 
firm. That is, regulators first establish compensation arrangements (define how the firm’s 
budget constraint or “revenue requirements” will be determined) to deal as effectively as 
possible with adverse selection and moral hazard problems given the information 
structure assumed.  The regulator separately establishes a second best price structure to 
deal with allocational efficiency considerations.  These prices may not yield enough 
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revenue to cover all of the firm’s costs, with the difference coming from net government 
transfers (or vice versa).  In addition, Laffont and Tirole introduce managerial effort (e) 
as a variable that affects costs.  Managers have a disutility of effort (U) and must be 
compensated for it.  Accordingly, the utility of management also appears in the social 
welfare function. 
 What does the regulator know about the firm ex ante and ex post?    The literature 
that focuses on adverse selection builds on the fundamental paper by Baron and Myerson 
(1982). There the regulator does not know the firm’s cost opportunities ex ante but has 
information about the probability distribution over the firm’s possible cost opportunities.7  
Nor can the regulator observe or audit the firm’s costs ex post.  The firm does know its 
own cost opportunities ex ante and ex post.  The firm’s demand is known by both the 
regulator and the regulated firm.  There is no managerial effort in these early models of 
incentive mechanism design.  Accordingly, the analysis deals with a pure adverse 
selection problem with no potential inefficiencies or moral hazard associated with 
inadequate managerial effort.  The regulation in the presence of adverse selection 
literature then proceeds to consider asymmetric information about the firm’s demand 
function, where the firm knows its demand but either the regulator does not observe 
demand ex ante or ex post or learns about demand only ex post (Lewis and Sappington 
1988a; Riordan 1984).    
 In light of common U.S. and Canadian regulatory practice, a natural extension of 
these models is to assume that the regulated firm’s actual realized costs are observable ex 
post, at least with uncertainty. Baron and Besanko (1984) considers cases where a firm’s 
                                                 
7 In models that distinguish between fixed and variable costs, the regulator may know the fixed costs but 
not the variable costs.  See Armstrong and Sappington (2003). 
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costs are “audited” ex post, but the actual realized costs resulting from the audit are 
observable by the regulator with a probability less than one.  The regulator can use this 
information to reduce the costs of adverse selection.   Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993) 
consider cases where the firm’s realized costs are fully observable by the regulator.  
However, absent the simultaneous introduction of an uncertain scope for cost reductions 
through managerial effort, the regulatory problem then becomes trivial --- just set prices 
equal to the firm’s realized costs.  Accordingly, Laffont and Tirole (1986a, 1993) 
introduce managers of the firm who can choose the amount of cost reducing effort that 
they expend.  Managerial effort is not observable by the regulator ex ante or ex post, but 
realized production costs are fully known to the regulator as are the managerial 
“production function” that transforms managerial effort into cost reductions and the 
managers’ utility over effort function.  The regulated firm fully observes managerial 
effort, the cost reducing effects of managerial effort, and demand.  It also knows what 
managerial utility would be at different levels of effort.  Armstrong and Sappington 
(2003) advance this analysis by considering cases where the regulated firm is uncertain 
about the operating costs that will be realized but knows that it can reduce costs by 
increasing managerial effort, though in a way that creates a moral hazard problem but no 
adverse selection problem.  In the face of uncertainty over its costs, they consider cases 
where the firm may be either risk-neutral or risk averse.   
 What instruments are available to the regulator and how do the regulator and the 
regulated firm interact over time?  Much of the incentive regulation literature is static.  
The regulator (or the government through the regulator) can offer a menu of prices (or 
fixed price contracts) with or without a fixed fee or transfer payment.  The menu may 
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contain prices that are contingent on realized costs (which can be thought of as penalties 
or rewards for performance) in those models where regulators observe costs ex post.  
Some of these instruments may be costly to utilize (e.g. transfer payments and auditing 
efforts).  The more instruments the regulator has at its disposal and the lower the costs of 
using them, the closer the regulator will be able to get to the full information efficiency 
benchmark. 
In the two-type case, the optimal regulatory mechanism involves offering the 
regulated firm a choice between two regulatory contract options.  One is a fixed price 
option that leaves some rent if the firm is a low-cost type but negative rent if it is a high 
cost type.  The second is a cost-contingent contract that distorts the firm’s effort if it is a 
high cost type but leaves it no rent.  The high powered scheme is the most attractive to 
the low-cost type and the low-powered scheme is the most attractive to the high cost type.  
The expected cost of the distortion of effort if the firm is a high cost type is balanced 
against the expected cost of leaving additional rent to the firm if it is a low cost type --- 
the fundamental tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction. 
The two-type example can be generalized to a continuum of types (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993, pp. 137ff).  If we assume that β has a continuous distribution from some 
lower bound βL to some upper bound βH with a cumulative distribution F(β) and a strictly 
positive density f(β) where F is assumed to satisfy a monotone hazard rate condition so 
that F(β)/f(β) is non-decreasing in β.8  The regulator maximizes expected social welfare 
subject to the firm participation and incentive compatibility constraints as before and 
incentive compatibility requires a mechanism that leaves more rent to the firm the lower 
                                                 
8 Most commonly used distribution satisfy this assumption, e.g. uniform and normal distributions. 
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is its type β, with the highest cost type getting no rent, the lowest cost type getting the 
most rent and intermediate type’s rent defined by the difference in their marginal costs.  
Similarly, the effort of the lowest cost type is optimal and the effort of the highest cost 
type is distorted the most, with intermediate types having smaller levels of distortion (and 
more rents) as β declines toward βL.  In the case of a continuous distribution of types, the 
optimality conditions are directly analogous to those for the two-type case. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that these optimality conditions can be 
implemented by offering the firm a menu of linear contracts, which in their model are 
transfer or incentive payments in excess of realized costs (which are also reimbursed), of 
the form:  
 t(β, c) = a(β) – b(β)c  
where a is a fixed payment, b is a cost contingent payment, and a and b are decreasing in 
β.   
We can rewrite the transfer payment equation in terms of the gross transfer to the firm 
including the unit cost reimbursement: 
 Rf = a(β) – b(β)c + c = a(β) + (1-b(β))c     (36) 
where da/db > 0   
(for a given β a unit increase in the slope of the incentive payment must be compensated 
by an increase in the fixed payment to cover the increase in production costs) 
and d2a/db2 < 0 
(the fixed payment is a concave function of the slope of the incentive scheme.) 
(See Figure 1)  The lowest cost type chooses a fixed price contract with a transfer net of 
costs equal to UL and the firm is the residual claimant on cost reducing effort (b = 1).  As 
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β increases, the transfer is less sensitive to the firm’s realized costs (b declines), the rent 
is lower (a declines), and the efficiency distortion from suboptimal effort increases.       
 
Note that if regulators utilized an optimal menu of contracts of this type and one 
were to try empirically to relate a cross section of regulated firms’ realized costs to the 
power of the incentive scheme they had selected, a correlation between the power of the 
incentive scheme and the firm’s realized costs would not tell us anything directly about 
the incentive effects of higher-powered schemes in terms of inducing optimal effort and 
mitigating moral hazard problems.  This is the case because the firms with the lower 
inherent costs will rationally choose the higher powered contracts. Assume that we had 
data for regulated firms serving different geographic regions (e.g. different states) which 
had different inherent cost opportunities (a range of possible values for β).  If the 
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regulators in each state offered the optimal menu of incentive contracts, the low cost 
opportunity firms would choose high powered contracts and the high cost opportunity 
firms would choose lower powered contracts.  Accordingly, the effects of the 
mechanisms on mitigating the rents that would accrue to a low cost firm’s information 
advantage from the effects of the mechanism on inducing optimal effort are not easily 
distinguished empirically.  When firms are given a choice of incentive mechanisms in 
this way, the endogeneity between the power of the mechanism chosen by the firm and 
realized costs should be accounted for carefully in empirical work aimed at measuring the 
effects of incentive regulation on firm performance ex post.  
One way in which regulators can effectively reduce their information 
disadvantage is by using competitive benchmarks or “yardstick regulation” in the price 
setting process.  Shleifer (1985) shows that if there are multiple non-competing but 
otherwise identical firms (e.g. gas distribution companies in firms in different states), an 
efficient regulatory mechanism involves setting the price for each firm based on the costs 
of the other firms.  Each individual firm has no control over the price it will be allowed to 
charge (unless the firms can collude) since it is based on the realized costs of (n-1) other 
firms.  So, effectively each firm has a fixed price contract and the regulator can be 
assured that the budget balance constraint will be satisfied since if the firms are identical 
prices will never fall below their “efficient” realized costs.  This mechanism effectively 
induces each firm to compete against the others.  The equilibrium is a price that just 
covers all of the firm’s efficient costs as if they competed directly with one another. 
Of course, the regulator is unlikely to be able to find a large set of truly identical 
firms.  However, hedonic regression, frontier cost function estimation and related 
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statistical techniques can be used to normalize cost variations for exogenous differences 
in firm attributes to develop normalized benchmark costs (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001, 2003; 
Estache, Rossi, Ruzzier 2004).  As we shall see below, these benchmark costs can then be 
used by the regulator in a yardstick framework or in other ways to reduce its information 
disadvantage, allowing it to use high powered incentive mechanisms without incurring 
the cost of excessive rents that would accrue if the regulator had a greater cost 
disadvantage.  However, data to perform this type of benchmarking analysis are not 
always available, a variety of benchmarking techniques can be utilized, and the failure to 
integrate cost and quality variables can lead to misleading results (Giannakis, Jamasb and 
Pollitt 2004; Jamasb and Pollitt 2001). 
 Of additional practical interest are issues that arise as we consider the dynamic 
interactions between the regulated firm and the regulator and the availability and 
utilization of mechanisms that the regulator potentially has available to reduce its 
information disadvantage.  It is inevitable that the regulator will learn more about the 
regulated firm as they interact over time.  So, for example, if the regulator can observe a 
firm’s realized costs ex post it will learn a lot about its true cost opportunities. Should the 
regulator use that information to reset the prices that the regulated firm receives 
(commonly known as a “ratchet” --- Weitzman 1980)?  Or is it better for the regulator to 
commit to a particular contract ex ante, which may be contingent on realized costs, but 
the regulator is then not permitted to use the information gained from observing realized 
costs to change the terms and conditions of the regulatory contract offered to the firm?  Is 
it credible for the regulator to commit not to renegotiate the contract, especially in light of 
U.S. regulatory legal doctrines that have been interpreted as foreclosing the ability of a 
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regulatory commission to bind future commissions?  Clearly, if the regulated firm knows 
that information about its realized costs can be used to renegotiate the terms of its 
contract, this will affect its behavior ex ante.  It may have incentives to engage in less 
cost reduction in period 1 or try to fool the regulator into thinking it is a high cost firm so 
that it can continue to earn rents in period 2.  Of if the regulated firm has a choice 
between technologies that involve sunk cost commitments, will the possibility of ex post 
opportunism or regulatory expropriation, perhaps driven by the capture of the regulator 
by other interest groups, affect its willingness to invest in the lowest cost technologies 
when they involve more significant sunk cost commitments (leading to the opposite of 
the Averch-Johnson effect --- Averch and Johnson 1962; Baumol and Klevorick 1970).   
These issues are all of considerable importance when applying incentive regulation 
concepts in practice. 
These dynamic issues have been examined theoretically more intensively over 
time and represent a merging of the literature on regulation with the literature on 
contracts and dynamic incentive mechanisms more generally. (Laffont and Tirole 1988b, 
1990a, 1993; Baron and Besanko 1987a; Armstrong and Vickers 1991, 2000; Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers 1995)   The impacts of regulatory lag of different durations (Baumol 
and Klevorick 1970, Klevorick 1973, Joskow 1974) and other price adjustment 
procedures have been analyzed theoretically as well (Vogelsang and Finsinger 1979; 
Sappington and Sibley 1988, 1990). 
As I will discuss further below, one of the regulatory mechanisms utilized 
extensively in the UK since its utility sectors were privatized is effectively a fixed price 
contract (actually a price cap that adjusted for general movements in input prices and an 
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assumed target rate of productivity growth --- a so-called RPI-X mechanism as discussed 
further below) with a ratchet every five (or so) years when the level of the price cap is 
reset to reflect the current realized (or forecast) cost of service (Beesley and Littlechild 
1989; Brennan 1989; Isaac 1989; Sibley 1989; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994).   It 
has been observed that regulated firms appear to make their greatest cost reduction efforts 
during the early years of the price cap period and then exerted less effort at reducing costs 
as the date of the price review proceeding approached (OFGEM 2004a, 2004c, 2004e, 
2004f).  More generally, the dynamic attributes of the regulatory process and how 
regulators use information about costs revealed by the regulated firm’s behavior over 
time have significant effects on the incentives the regulated firm faces and on its behavior 
(Gilbert and Newbery 1994). 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
 While the theoretical literature on incentive regulation is quite rich, it still 
provides relatively little direct guidance for empirical application in specific 
circumstances.  Regulators need to find answers to a number of practical questions to 
apply the theory in practice in the design of actual incentive regulation mechanisms.  
Among the questions that must be answered are the following: 
a. Where does the regulator’s information about the firm’s actual costs and the 
distribution of cost opportunities come from?   If regulators are going to apply incentive 
regulation mechanisms that are cost contingent they must have some consistent 
mechanism for measuring a firm’s actual costs.  These costs include operating costs (e.g. 
labor), the cost of capital investments (e.g. the cost of physical distribution network 
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equipment), and the financial components necessary to transform this capital investment 
cost stock into a flow of rental or user charges for capital services (e.g. depreciation rates, 
the opportunity cost of capital, the appropriate debt/equity ratio, income taxes) over time.  
Capital cost accounting issues have largely been ignored in the theoretical 
literature on incentive regulation.  Although it has been of limited concern to 
contemporary economists, any well functioning regulatory system needs to adopt good 
cost accounting rules, reporting requirements for costs, output, prices, and other 
dimensions of firm performance, and enforce auditing and monitoring protocols to ensure 
that the regulated firm applies the auditing rules and adheres to its reporting obligations.  
Much of the development of U.S. regulation during the first half of the 20th century 
focused on the development of these foundation components required for any good 
regulatory system that involves cost contingent regulatory mechanisms.   
Of course, cost is only one dimension of firm performance.  Firm performance 
may also have various “quality” dimensions and there are likely to be inherent tradeoffs 
between cost and quality.  If incentives are to be extended to the quality dimension as 
well, as they should be, then these quality dimensions must be defined and associated 
performance indicia measured by the firm, reported to the regulator, and must be subject 
to auditing protocols. 
 Regulators also need information to develop a view about the distribution of cost 
opportunities, consumer valuations of service quality, and other dimensions of firm 
performance to implement incentive regulation mechanisms that do not leave too much 
rent to regulated firms and do not lead to excessive managerial efficiency.  Regulators 
need to have the resources to develop information about industry performance norms and 
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the causes of variations in the performance of regulated firms.  Accordingly, they need 
the resources to commission industry studies that give them this kind of information so 
that their information disadvantage can be reduced. 
b.  Should the regulator offer the regulated firm a menu of contracts or a specific 
contract with a single set of values for a and b as discussed above?  The Laffont-Tirole 
framework implies that firms should be offered a menu of cost-contingent contracts from 
which they can choose.  The menu forces the firm to reveal its type ex post and allows for 
a better balance of efficiency and rent extraction than would a single linear incentive 
contract designed ex ante based on the same information and subject to the same budget 
balance constraints.  However, it appears that regulators typically offer firms only a 
single regulatory contract and when the contracts is cost contingent it is typically linear 
(Schmalensee 1989).  I am aware of two situations in which regulated firms were offered 
a menu of cost contingent or sliding scale contracts. The first relates to the System 
Operator (SO) incentive schemes that have been offered to the National Grid Company in 
England and Wales discussed below.  The second is the menu of sliding scale 
mechanisms offered to the electric distribution companies in the UK for determining 
future capital expenditure allowances and associated user charges for capital services 
pursuant to the most recent price cap review in late 2004.   These menus are discussed in 
more detail below as well.  However, there may be more use of a de facto menu of 
contracts approach than first meets the eye when we take the attributes of the regulatory 
review process itself into account.  The final regulatory mechanism applied to a regulated 
firm is often the result of formal and informal negotiations involving proposals by the 
regulator’s staff, the regulatory firm and interested third parties.  This process may have 
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similarities to the regulator’s offer of a menu of contracts in the sense that the parties 
negotiate over the attributes of the incentive mechanism.  We see only the final outcome 
of these negotiations. 
c.  What benchmarks are to be used to arrive at starting values for the regulated firm’s 
costs, revenues, and other performance indicia and how are these benchmarks adjusted 
over time?  In some cases regulators accept the firm’s current levels of costs and other 
dimensions of performance and focus on benchmarks for performance improvements, 
effectively benchmarking the firm against its historical performance.  This approach 
reflects the assumption that the firm can do better than it has in the past, but still leaves 
open the question of performance improvement norms.  Another approach is to 
benchmark the firm’s current performance using appropriate comparisons with other 
similarly situated firms, properly adjusting for differences in the cost opportunities and 
demand patters faced by similar but not identical comparator firms.  Where there is not a 
set of reasonable comparator firms to draw upon, regulators may rely on engineering and 
management “experts” to study the firm’s performance and opine on cost improvement 
opportunities and the associated uncertainties, perhaps drawing analogies from 
components of firms in other industries.   
d.  What should be the power of the incentive scheme?  If the regulator offers a menu of 
cost-contingent contracts, the height and the slope of the incentive scheme must be 
defined (a and b above).  If the regulator apples a single incentive mechanism both the 
fixed component and the “sharing” or “sliding scale” fraction must be defined.   If the 
regulatory mechanism is a price cap, both the starting values for prices or the average 
price level (po for UK regulation of electric, gas, and water distribution and transmission 
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networks) and the “x” intertemporal adjustment factor must be defined.  In addition, an 
appropriate inflation index (RPI in the UK) must be identified.   
In practice, incentive regulation mechanisms typically also have “resets” or 
“ratchets” and the period of “regulatory lag” between price reviews needs to be defined.   
As the review period gets longer the power of the incentive mechanism increases and 
vice versa.  Finally, many incentive regulation mechanisms used in practice have caps 
and floors that effectively define a collar on the operation of the mechanism.  So, for 
example, a cap and floor are often applied that limit the gains and the losses that the 
regulated firm can incur under the incentive mechanism.  Once the cap or floor is hit the 
mechanism effectively defaults to pure cost of service regulation.  The rationale for the 
use of caps and floors superimposed on to a sliding scale scheme is not immediately 
obvious from incentive regulation theory and is likely to have poor incentive properties 
around the points where the collar kicks in.  The use of caps and floors is probably best 
thought of as a way for regulators to recognize the range of outcomes anticipated in the 
design of the mechanism and the associated starting values and sharing fractions that 
have been defined.  When the caps and floors are hit this effectively triggers a 
renegotiation, reset or ratchet process.   
e.  Should the incentive mechanism be comprehensive or “partial?”   There are multiple 
dimensions of firm performance defined by cost and quality indicia and the tradeoffs 
between them.  Most regulated firms supply multiple products for which demand and cost 
attributes vary.  There are also multiple dimensions of firm costs with different 
adjustment lags.  Operating costs can be adjusted relatively quickly, while capital costs 
are often long-lived and can be economically adjusted much more slowly.  Moreover, 
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both the level and adjustment opportunities for operating costs depend upon the attributes 
of the legacy stock of capital and investments in new facilities and can both expand the 
firm’s capacity to supply particular products and affect its operating costs.  Capital and 
operating costs are inherently interdependent with varying adjustment lags.  Moreover, as 
a practical matter, the line between an operating cost and a capital cost may not be well 
defined except by clear accounting rules.  A hammer that last for five years may be 
expensed while software that has a useful life of three years may be capitalized.   Under 
some incentive regulation mechanisms this creates opportunities for gaming by expensing 
capital costs or capitalizing operating costs.   
Ideally, a comprehensive incentive regulation mechanism that consistently 
integrates all cost and quality relationships at a point and time and over time would be 
applied.  However, as a practical matter this often places very challenging information 
and implementation burdens on the regulator.  Partial mechanisms or a portfolio of only 
loosely harmonized mechanisms are often used by regulators.  Operating and capital cost 
norms and targets are typically developed separately and the effective power of the 
incentive scheme applicable to operating and capital costs may vary between them.  
Separate incentive mechanisms may be applied to measures of quality than to measures 
of total operating and capital costs.   This reality represents perhaps the most significant 
variation between received incentive regulation theory and incentive regulation in 
practice. 
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IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE 
a.  Early applications 
 Although the theoretical literature on incentive regulation is fairly recent, we can 
trace the earliest applications of incentive regulation concepts back to the early regulation 
of the manufactured gas distribution sector9 (town gas) in England in the mid-19th century 
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1986, Hammond, Johnes, and Robinson, 2002).  A sliding 
scale mechanism in which the dividends available to shareholders were linked to 
increases and decreases in gas prices from some base level was first introduce in England 
in 1855 (Hammond, Johnes, and Robinson, 2002 p. 255).  The mechanism established a 
base dividend rate of 10%.  If gas prices increased above a base level the dividend rate 
was reduced according to a sharing formula.  However, if gas prices fell below the base 
level the dividend rate did not increase (a “one-way” sliding scale).  The mechanism was 
made symmetric in 1867.  Note that the mechanism was not mandatory and it was 
introduced during a period of falling prices (Hammond, Johnes, and Robinson, 2002, pp. 
255-256).  A related profit sharing mechanism (what Hammond, Johnes and Robinson 
call the “Basic Price System”) was introduced in 1920 that provided a minimum 
guaranteed 5% dividend to the firm’s shareholders and shared changes in revenues from a 
base level between the consumers, the owners of the firm and the firm’s employees.  
Specifically, this mechanism established a basic price pb to yield a 5% dividend rate.  
This dividend rate was the minimum guaranteed to the firm. At the end of each financial 
year the firm’s actual revenues (R) were compared to its basic revenues Rb = pb times the 
quantity sold.  The difference between R and Rb was then shared between consumers, 
                                                 
9 This is before the development of natural gas.  “City gas” was manufactured from coal by local gas 
distribution companies.  At the time there were both private and municipal gas distribution companies in 
operation in England.  
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investors and employees, apparently subject to the constraint that the dividend rate would 
not fall below 5%. 
 In the early 20th century, U.S. economists took note of the experience with sliding 
scale mechanisms for local manufactured gas utilities in England, but appear to have 
concluded that they were not well matched to the regulation of electricity and telephone 
service (and other sectors) where demand and technology were changing fast and future 
costs were very uncertain. (Clark, 1913)  Cost of service regulation (with regulatory lag, 
prudence reviews, and public planning processes) evolved initially as the favored 
alternative in the U.S. and other countries with private (rather than state-owned) regulated 
monopolies and the experience in England during the 19th and early 20th centuries was 
largely forgotten by both regulators and students of regulation.  
 State public utility commissions in the U.S. began to experiment with formal 
performance based regulation mechanisms for electric utilities in the early 1980s.  The 
early programs were targeted at specific components of an electric utility’s costs or 
operating performance such as generation plant availability, heat rates, or construction 
costs (Joskow and Schmalensee 1986, Sappington, et. al. 2001).  However, formal 
comprehensive incentive regulation mechanism have been slow to spread in the U.S. 
electric power industry (Sappington et. al. 2001), though rate freezes, rate case moratoria, 
price cap mechanisms and other alternative mechanisms have been adopted in many 
states, sometimes informally since the mid- 1990s.   
   b. Price cap mechanisms: general considerations 
 Beginning in the mid-1980s a particular form of incentive regulation was 
introduced for the regulated segments of the privatized electric gas, telephone and water 
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utilities in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and portions of Latin American as well as in 
the regulated segments of the telecommunications industry in the U.S.10   The primary 
(but not the only) mechanism chosen was the “price cap” (Beesley and Littlechild 1989; 
Brennan 1989; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994; Isaac 1991).  Under price cap 
regulation the regulator sets an initial price po (or a vector of prices for multiple 
products).  This price (or a weighted average of the prices allowed for firms supplying 
multiple products or different types of customers) is then adjusted from one year to the 
next for changes in inflation (rate of input price increase or RPI) and a target productivity 
change factor “x.”  Accordingly, the price in period 1 is given by: 
 
p1 = po (1+ RPI – x)11      
 
Typically, some form of cost-based regulation is used to set po.  The price cap mechanism 
then operates for a pre-established time period (e.g. 5 years).  At the end of this period a 
new starting price and a new x factor are established after another cost-of-service and 
prudence or efficiency review of the firm’s costs. That is, there is a pre-scheduled 
regulatory-ratchet built into the system. 
As discussed earlier, in theory, a price cap mechanism is a high-powered “fixed 
price” regulatory contract which provides powerful incentives for the firm to reduce 
costs.  Moreover, if the price cap mechanism is applied to a (properly) weighted average 
                                                 
10 The U.S. is behind many other countries in the application of incentive regulation principles to electric 
distribution and transmission, though their use is slowly spreading in the U.S. beyond telecommunications. 
 
11 Many implementations of price cap regulation also have “z” factors.  Z factors reflect cost elements that 
cannot be controlled by the regulated firm and are passed through in retail prices.  For example, in the UK, 
the charges distribution companies pay for connections to the transmission network are treated as pass-
throughs.  Changes in property tax rates are also often treated as pass-throughs.   
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of the revenues the firm earns from each product it supplies, the firm has an incentive to 
set the second-best prices for each service (Laffont and Tirole 2000; Armstrong and 
Vickers 1991).   It is also fairly clear that pure “forever” price cap mechanisms are not 
optimal from the perspective of an appropriate tradeoff between efficiency incentives and 
rent extraction (Schmalensee 1989). 
 In practice, price cap mechanisms apply elements of cost of service regulation, 
yardstick competition, high powered “fixed price” incentives, plus a ratchet.  Price caps 
on operating costs or capital plus operating costs are often one component of a larger 
portfolio of incentive mechanisms.   As I will show presently, the details of constructing 
a price cap mechanism for electric distribution and transmission networks are more 
complicated than is often thought.  Moreover, the regulated electric or gas distribution 
firm’s ability to determine the structure of prices under an overall revenue cap is typically 
limited.  Price caps applied to electricity and gas distribution and transmission are used 
primarily as incentive mechanism not as a mechanism to induce optimal pricing.  In 
telecommunications, regulated firms are given more pricing freedom so they affect both 
performance incentives and pricing incentives. 
It is worth noting again that in an ongoing regulated firm context, a pure price cap 
without cost-sharing (a sliding scale mechanism) is not likely to be optimal given 
asymmetric information and uncertainty about future productivity opportunities 
(Schmalensee 1989).  Prices would have to be set too high to satisfy the firm participation 
constraint and too much rent with be left on the table for the firm.  The application of a 
ratchet from time to time that resets prices to reflect observed costs is a form of cost-
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contingent dynamic regulatory contract.  It softens cost-reducing incentives but extracts 
more rents for consumers. 
 A natural question to ask about price cap mechanisms is where does “x’ (and 
perhaps po) come from (Bernstein and Sappington 1999)?  Conceptually, assuming that 
RPI is a measure of a general input price inflation index, x should reflect the difference 
between the expected or target rate of total factor productivity growth for the regulated 
firm and the corresponding productivity growth rate for the economy as a whole and the 
difference between the rate of change in the regulated firm’s input prices and input prices 
faced by firms generally in the economy.  That is, the regulated firm’s prices should rise 
at a rate that reflects the general rate of inflation in input prices less an offset for higher 
(or lower) than average productivity growth and an offset for lower (or higher) input 
price inflation.  Unfortunately, the theory advanced by Bernstein and Sappington is rarely 
applied in practice. 
In early applications, the computation of x has often been fairly ad hoc.  The 
initial application of the price cap mechanism by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to AT&T’s intercity and information services used historical 
productivity growth and added an arbitrary “customer dividend” to choose an x that was 
larger than the historical rate of productivity growth.  However, the expectation here was 
that the need for regulation would be transitory and would be phased out for AT&T’s 
services as competition expanded.  In England and Wales and some other countries, 
statistical benchmarking methods have come to be used to help to determine the relative 
efficiency of individual firms’ operating costs and service quality compared to their 
peers.  This information can then be used as an input to setting values for both po and x 
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(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001, 2003, OFGEM 2004c) to provide incentives for those far from 
the efficiency frontier to move toward it and to reward the most efficient firms in order to 
induce them to stay on the efficiency frontier, in a fashion that is effectively an 
application of yardstick regulation.  A variety of empirical methods have been applied to 
identify an operating cost efficiency frontier and to measure how far from this operating 
cost efficiency frontier individual regulated firms lie.  The value for x is then defined in 
such a way as to move the firms to the frontier over a pre-specified period of time (e.g. 
five years).  These methods have recently been expanded to include quality of service 
considerations (Giaanakis, Jamasb and Pollitt 2004).  Benchmark rankings of relative 
performance may change significantly when quality attributes are introduced.  
Accordingly benchmarking cost and quality as separable attributes is clearly problematic. 
 The extensive use of periodic “ratchets” or “resets to cost” along with price cap 
mechanisms reflect the difficulties of defining an ideal long-term value for po and x and 
the standard tradeoffs between efficiency incentives, rent extraction and firm viability 
constraints.  These periodic ratchets necessarily dull incentives for cost reduction, 
however.  Note in particular that with a pre-defined five year ratchet, a dollar of cost 
reduction in year one is worth a lot more than a dollar of cost reduction in year four since 
the cost savings are retained by the firm only until the next reset anniversary (OFGEM 
2004a, 2004e, 2004f). 
 Although it is not discussed too much in the empirical literature, the development 
of the parameters of price cap mechanisms using statistical benchmarking methods have 
typically focused primarily on operating costs only, with capital cost allowances 
established through more traditional utility planning and cost-of-service regulatory 
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accounting methods including the specification of a rate base (regulatory asset value or 
RAV), depreciation rates, debt and equity costs, debt/equity ratios, tax allowances, etc..  
Since operating costs for distribution networks are often a smaller fraction of total costs 
than are capital-related costs, the focus on operating costs (or so-called “controllable 
costs”) is potentially misleading.   In addition, it is widely recognized that a pure price 
cap mechanism provides incentives to reduce both costs and the quality of service 
(Banerjee 2003).  Accordingly, price cap mechanisms are increasingly accompanied 
either by specific performance standards and the threat of regulatory penalties if they are 
not met or formal PBR mechanisms that set performance standards and specify penalties 
and rewards for the firm for falling above or below these performance norms (OFGEM 
2004d, 2004f; Sappington 2003; Ai and Sappington 2004; Ai, Martinez and Sappington 
2004). 
c. The Basic Price Cap Mechanism for Electric Distribution Companies in the 
 UK Today 
 There are 14 electric distribution companies in the UK, several of which are under 
common ownership within a holding company structure.  These companies, which are 
referred to as Regional Electricity Companies or RECs, provide delivery services in 
specific geographic franchise areas to transport electricity from points of interconnection 
with the high voltage transmission network to points of interconnection with final 
consumers.  Their total revenues and the associated prices for using their networks are 
regulated by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM).  The distribution 
companies themselves do not contract for electricity for resale to final customers, a 
competitive function referred to as “electricity supply” in the UK, though they may have 
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functionally separated or “ring fenced” supply affiliates which do so.  The primary 
mechanism used to determine the total revenues that a regulated electricity distribution 
firm is permitted to recover from its prices (the allowed revenue and associated average 
price level) is a price cap mechanism that sets an initial starting value for revenues (po), 
specifies an exogenous input price index for adjusting revenues for input price inflation 
and the associated price levels over time (RPI), and a productivity factor “x” which 
further adjusts revenues and profits over time.  The value for x can be either positive or 
negative or zero.  The regulatory framework establishes values for po, x, and the relevant 
RPI index once every five years. 
 The po and x values are developed based on a review of the relative efficiency of 
each firm’s operating costs, the firm’s current capital rate base (adjusted for depreciation 
and inflation since the previous price review), referred to as the firm’s regulatory asset 
value (RAV), forecasts of future capital additions required to provide target levels of 
service quality, and the application of depreciation rates, estimates of the cost of the 
firm’s debt and equity capital, assumptions about the firm’s dept/equity ratio, tax 
allowances and other variables. The allowed revenues for the firm over the 5-year period 
are then the sum of allowed operating costs and allowed capital costs determined in each 
year.  Po and x are chosen so that the present discounted values of revenues over the five-
year period is equal to the present discounted value of the total operating and capital-
related charges that have been allowed for each distribution company during the price 
review.   The choice of the specific values for po and x that satisfies this present 
discounted value property is a matter of judgment (OFGEM 2004f).  Historically, this 
choice was driven by the notion that the regulated firms should be given some time to 
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achieve reductions in operating costs to the efficient benchmarked level, leading to a 
relatively high initial value for po and a value of x that brings operating costs to their 
efficient levels over the period the price cap is in effect.  OFGEM appears to have 
abandoned this “glide path” approach in the most recent price review for electric 
distribution companies (2004), perhaps because the initial value of po would have 
otherwise increased significantly as a result of a large increase in target investment 
expenditures (OFGEM 2004f). 
Because the overall price cap covers both capital and operating costs, the ultimate 
value of x depends on both the target efficiency improvements in operating costs and the 
forecast carrying charges on the existing RAV plus the carrying charges on allowed 
levels for future investments over the 5-year price control period.  So, for example, real 
operating costs may be targeted to fall over time, implying a value of x in the RPI-x 
formula of say 1.5% per year.  However, if capital-related costs are forecast to increase 
by 1.5% per year, the value of x used in the price cap mechanism over the five year 
period would be negative (yielding trajectory of increasing real prices) since capital-
related charges including taxes are typically about double allowed operating costs for a 
UK electric distribution company.   
In the most recent review of prices for electric distribution companies, each firm’s 
price cap was set so that the value of x is zero.  Accordingly, prices will rise based on 
changes in RPI only.  As can be seen from Figure 2, there was a large range in the change 
in po allowed at the beginning of the new price control period among the 14 distribution 
companies (- 9% to +9%) with an average increase of po of 1.3% from levels prevailing 
at the end of the last price review period (OFGEM 2004c).  Figure 2 also summarizes the 
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negotiation process that led to the final proposals.  Accordingly, for each distribution 
company the initial level of allowed total revenues will increase with the rate of inflation 
with po set for each company so that the present discounted value of future revenues is 
equal to the present discounted value of the sum of target operating and capital costs over 
the 5-year period.  The choice of a zero value for x does not imply that there are no 
improvements in operating cost efficiency built into the mechanism.  The target 
improvements in operating costs are built into the total allowed cost forecasts and are 
reflected in the choice of po given OFGEM’s decision to have a flat real price trajectory 
over the price review period.  OFGEM may have decided to “smooth” the real price 
increase implied by the large increase in investment approved for the next price review 
period.  This is discussed further below. 
Since there are 14 distribution companies in the UK, the opportunity to perform 
statistical analyses of how operating costs vary with various causal factors and to 
estimate variations in efficiency across firms readily presents itself.  A variety of 
statistical analyses have been used by OFGEM to arrive at operating cost targets for each 
of the electric distribution companies (OFGEM 2004c).  These methods are now 
reasonably well developed and understood by the regulated firms and third parties.  
During the 5-year price control period, the firms are (in principle) the full residual 
claimants on variations between the target and the actual operating costs. 
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FIGURE 2 
UK ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTON PRICE CAPS 2005-2010 
(x = 0) 
OFGEM (2004f) 
 
Despite the fact that capital carrying costs are roughly twice operating costs for 
electric distribution companies, the benchmarking methods for determining allowed 
capital expenditures are much less well-developed.  Of course, during any particular 
review period the future stream of allowed carrying charges associated with the stock of 
capital investments are heavily influenced by historical investments that have been 
included in the RAV in the past, just like under rate of return regulation.  During a new 
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price review, the carrying charges for the historical components of the RAV are affected 
only by the choice of the allowed returns on debt and equity and the debt/equity ratio 
assumed for each firm, as well as any changes in depreciation rates.  During a new price 
review, however, future capital investments are still a variable cost that can be influenced 
by the capital expenditure allowances approved by the regulator and built into the future 
allowed capital carrying charges.  Accordingly, much of the focus of the price review is 
on the approval of a target capital expenditure schedule for the next five-year period.  
Future investments in capital facilities do not have an insignificant effect on future costs 
and prices, especially in light of the fact that in the latest price review OFGEM was 
presented with increases in capital expenditures that averaged over 50% from the most 
recent price review period (OFGEM 2004c, 2004f). 
Formal statistical benchmarking studies of the type that are now applied to 
operating costs (so-called “controllable costs”) have not been applied to determine 
allowed investment costs over the next price cap period for each electric distribution 
company.  The appropriate investment program may vary widely depending on variables 
like customer growth rates, load growth rates, equipment ages and replacement 
expenditures, underground vs. above ground facilities, service quality improvement 
needs, etc., with little necessary relationship to recent historical trends.  Indeed, the rate 
of investment in electricity network infrastructure has historically been quite cyclical.   
As a result, it has proven difficult to develop useful statistical benchmarks for future 
capital additions.  Instead, each of the regulated firms presents a proposed capital 
investment budget to the regulator and the regulator retains engineering consultants to 
evaluate the proposals and takes evidence from third parties which use the distribution 
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networks as well.  This has historically been a rather contentious process, sometimes 
yielding significant differences between what the companies’ claim they need and what 
the consultants claim they need to meet their legal responsibilities to provide safe and 
reliable service efficiently. 
Regulatory judgments about allowances for future capital expenditures has 
become a more sensitive issue for regulators in the UK (and the US) as reliability 
considerations have become of greater political importance, as excess capacity has been 
squeezed out of the legacy capital stock, and an the large amount of infrastructure 
investment made in the 1950s and 1960s reaches the end of its useful life.  In the most 
recent price review period OFGEM adopted an innovative “menu” of sliding scale 
mechanisms approach to resolve the asymmetric information problem faced by the 
regulator as she tries to deal with differences between the firms’ claims and the 
consultants’ claims (OFGEM 2004f) about future capital investment requirements to 
meet reliability targets.    The sliding scale menu allows firms to choose between getting 
a lower capital expenditure allowance but a higher powered incentive (and a higher 
expected return on investment) that allows them to retain more of the cost reduction if 
they can beat the target expenditure levels or a higher capital expenditure allowance 
combined with a lower powered sliding scale mechanism and lower expected return. 
(OFGEM 2004f)   The sliding scale mechanism is based on the difference between the 
allowed capital expenditure target chosen by the firm from the menu and the firm’s actual 
capital expenditures during the 5-year price cap period.     
The menu of sliding scale incentives is reproduced as Figure 3 below.  The values 
for the sharing fractions are based on the ratio of the distribution company’s (DNO) 
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choice of capital expenditure target and that recommended by OFGEM’s consultant (PB 
Power).  These ratios vary between 100 and 140. For example, in Figure 3 if a firm 
agrees to accept a capital expenditure budget equal to 105% of the consultant’s 
recommendation  (PB Power = 100 in Figure 3) it would also be choosing the sliding 
scale in the first column.  It would get a base bonus of 2.5% of its target income.  If it’s 
actual expenditures turned out to be 70% of the target (through efficiencies) during the 
price control period it would get a 16.5% increase in its income as a reward.  If it greatly 
exceeds the target and has realized capital expenditures of 140% of the target than its 
income is reduced by 11.5% from the target.  
This is the most direct and extensive application of Laffont and Tirole’s menu of 
cost-contingent contracts result that I have seen.  However, it appears to be the case that 
the sliding scale scheme for capital expenditures is integrated into the price cap 
mechanism in a way that appears to make the power of the incentive scheme for capital 
expenditures appears to be different from the power of the incentive scheme applied to 
operating costs. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
OFGEM 2004f, p.87 
 Once the capital investment target for the price control period is determined, these 
investments are added to the starting value for the RAV or rate base as they are made.  
Depreciation charges for both the historical and new investments are then calculated for 
each future year.  The depreciation charges are a current capital expense in each year and 
are simultaneously deducted from the RAV.  An allowed rate of return equal to the firm’s 
weighted average real cost of capital before tax adjustments is determined and applied to 
the RAV in each year.  This yields a 5-year flow profile of real capital service charges 
reflecting depreciation on historical and allowed future investments and the firm’s real 
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opportunity cost of capital to which capital related taxes are added.  See Figure 4.  As 
discussed further below, the details of these computations for capital-related cost 
allowances are matched to the inflation adjusted price cap mechanism, but the basic 
concepts are quite similar to those applied to turn capital investments into a flow of 
capital service costs under traditional rate of return regulation (Joskow, 2005a). 
FIGURE 4 
 
OFGEM (2004f) 
The allowed capital charges for each year are then added to the allowed operating 
cost expenses for that year to yield the target total costs for each year of the price control 
period. This process leads to a set of future allowed real operating and capital-service 
related costs which will automatically be adjusted in nominal terms each year by the 
realized rate of inflation in the RPI index chosen.  A po and x value are chosen that 
together yield allowed revenues whose present discounted value is equal to the present 
discounted value of allowed costs.  As noted earlier, in the most recent price review 
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OFGEM chose to set x to zero which has the effect of “backloading” the revenues toward 
the end of the price review period.  An example of what the various operating and capital 
cost components look like for one distribution company (United Utilities) is displayed in 
Table 1.    
TABLE 1 
 
 
Source:  OFGEM 2004f, p. 127. 
 
There are a number of issues that have not been fully resolved in this price setting 
and incentive mechanism specification process.  First, as already noted, the 5-year ratchet 
potentially leads to differential incentives for cost reduction depending on how close the 
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firm is to the next price review.  OFGEM has indicated that it is aware of this problem 
and is committed to allowing firms to keep the benefits of “outperformance” (and 
presumably the costs of underperformance) for a full five years regardless of when during 
the 5-year review period the outperformance actually occurs.  For capital expenditures, 
OFGEM has adopted a formula for rolling adjustments in the RAV so that 
outperformance or underperformance incentives and penalties are reflected in prices for a 
five-year period.  Although OFGEM has made a commitment to allow OPEX savings to 
be retained for five years, it did not adopt a formal rolling OPEX adjustment mechanism 
in the latest price review do to imperfections in the operating cost accounting and 
reporting protocols that now exist (OFGEM 2004f).  OFGEM has started a process to 
develop a better uniform system of accounts and reporting requirements to facilitate 
improvements in the incentive regulation mechanisms. 
A second set of issues involves potential asymmetries between the treatment of 
operating costs and capital costs.  The power of the incentive schemes for operating costs 
and capital costs appears to be different for at least two reasons.  First, the sliding scale 
mechanism applies to capital cost variations but not operating cost variations.  In 
addition, there is not a well defined line between what is an operating cost that is 
expensed in a single year and what costs can be capitalized.  The firms may have 
incentives to capitalize operating costs to beat the OPEX incentives during the current 
review period in the hope that they will be included in the RAV during the next review 
period.  OFGEM is making efforts to better define rules for capitalizing expenditures to 
deter this kind of gaming.   Finally, when there is capital cost overspending the firm gets 
another crack to recover at least the undepreciated portion of these expenditures 
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beginning in the next price review.  Capital expenditures have lives that are typically 
much longer than the five year review period.  How should capital expenditures that 
exceed or fall short of targets be treated in the next price review?  Ordinarily these 
variances in capital expenditures may be handled through the incentive mechanism 
discussed above, including the impact of the rolling RAV calculation.  However, firms 
can try to make the case that overspending was justified and get it fully included in the 
next price review and OFGEM may claw back benefits of underspending that was due to 
reductions in service rather than efficiencies.  Obviously, these adjustments may be quite 
subjective and need to be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
A third set of issues relates to incentives to reduce both operating and capital costs 
today to increase profits during the current price control period, but with the result that 
service quality deteriorates either during the current review period or in subsequent 
periods.  Deferred maintenance (e.g. tree trimming) and deferred capital expenditures 
may lead to the deterioration of service quality in either the short run or the long run or 
both.  Regulated firms may hope that they can use adverse service quality trends to argue 
for higher allowances for operating and capital costs in future price reviews.  The UK 
regulatory process tries to deal with the relationships between operating and capital cost 
expenditures and service quality in two ways.  First, there are service quality performance 
norms and incentives that I will discuss presently.  Second, OFGEM reserves the right to 
“claw back” capital cost savings if they are clearly not the result of efficiencies but rather 
reflect efforts to cut services in the short run or the long run.  This is not an ideal 
approach since operating expenditures, capital expenditures and service quality are 
related in complex ways over time and space.  Indeed it sounds like “prudence reviews” 
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that are a component of traditional cost of service regulation in the U.S.  Moreover, 
operating cost benchmarking studies that do not take service quality and the quality of the 
capital stock into account can lead to misleading conclusions (Giannakis, Jamasb and 
Pollitt 2004). 
There is a final issue involving capital cost accounting that has been addressed 
properly in the UK, but not in all countries that have implemented price cap mechanisms.  
When a price cap mechanism (RPI – x) is applied to capital costs, the calculation of the 
amortization formula for capital (depreciation, rate of return on investment) and the 
valuation of the RAV need to be done in a particular way to ensure that there is not over 
or underpayment for capital services over the lives of capital investments.  Specifically, 
at the time of a price review the RAV (original cost of capital investments less 
depreciation) should be adjusted for inflation that has occurred since the last price review 
and the allowed rate of return on the RAV during the price review period should be based 
on the real cost of debt and equity capital net of taxes, with tax allowances then added 
back in.  Since prices are based on both operating and capital costs, the RPI - x formula 
essentially yields a nominal return equal to the real cost of capital plus the rate of 
inflation.  Capital related charges rise with the rate of inflation in this case and this is 
consistent with the RAV rising with the rate of inflation, together yielding an 
approximation to the economic depreciation rate (depending exactly on how the 
depreciation rates are set; Joskow 2005a, Schmalensee 1989a).  Simply bolting a price 
cap mechanism on to the capital cost accounting formulas used in the U.S. (Joskow 
2005a) would lead to the wrong result since regulated prices in the U.S. are based on the 
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nominal cost of capital and a depreciated original cost rate base (RAV) that is not 
adjusted for inflation.  
d. Service Quality Incentives for Electric Distribution Companies in the UK and 
the U.S. 12 
Any incentive regulation mechanism that provides incentives only for cost 
reduction also potentially creates incentives to reduce service quality when service 
quality and costs are positively related to one another.  The regulatory mechanisms 
developed for electric distribution companies in the UK have included an additional set 
of incentive mechanisms to provide incentives for the regulated firms to maintain or 
enhance service quality.   Adding quality-related incentives to cost-control incentives 
makes good sense in theory and in practice.  However, integrating these incentive 
mechanisms into a package that gives the correct incentives on all relevant margins 
remains a considerable challenge for incentive regulation in practice. 
 OFGEM has developed several incentive mechanisms targeted at various 
dimensions of performance.  These include: (a) two distribution service interruption 
incentive mechanisms targeted at the number of outages and the number of minutes per 
outage, (b) storm interruption payment obligations targeted at distribution company 
response times to outages caused by severe weather events, (c) quality of telephone 
responses during both ordinary weather conditions and storm conditions, (d) and a 
discretionary award based on surveys of customer satisfaction. Overall, about 4% of 
total revenue on the downside and an unlimited fraction of total revenue on the upside are 
subject to these quality of service incentive mechanisms.  See Figure 5.  Is this the right 
allocation of financial risk to variations in service quality?  Nobody really knows. 
                                                 
12 The UK has also applied incentive arrangements for distribution system losses that I will not discuss 
here. 
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FIGURE 5 
 
OFGEM 2004f, page 16. 
 OFGEM uses statistical and engineering benchmarking studies and forecasts of 
planned maintenance outages to develop targets for the number of customer outages and 
the average number of minutes per outage for each distribution company.  The individual 
distribution companies are disaggregated into different types (e.g. voltages) of 
distribution circuits and performance benchmarks and targets are developed for each 
based on comparative historical experience and engineering norms.  Aggregate 
performance targets for each distribution company are then defined by re-aggregating the 
targets for each type of circuit (OFGEM (2004c) appendix to June 2004 proposals) to 
match up circuits that make up each electric distribution company.  Both planned 
(maintenance) and unplanned outages are taken into account to develop the outage 
targets.  The targets incorporate performance improvements over time and reflect, in part, 
customer surveys of the value of improved service quality.  There is a fairly wide range 
in the targets among the 14 distribution companies in the UK, reflecting differences in the 
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configurations of the networks.  OFGEM also has added cost allowances into the price 
control (po) to reflect estimates of the costs of improving service quality in these 
dimensions.  See Figures 6, 7 and 8. 
FIGURE 6 
 
OFGEM  2004 Appendix, p.11 
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FIGURE 7 
 
OFGEM 2004f, p.17   FIGURE 8 
 
OFGEM 2004f, p. 17 
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 Once the performance targets are set, a financial penalty/reward structure needs to 
be applied to it to transform the physical targets into financial penalties and rewards.  The 
natural approach would be to apply estimates of the value of outages and outage minutes 
to customers (OFGEM surveys indicated customers valued reducing the number of 
minutes per outage more than the number of outages) to define prices for outages and 
outage duration.  OFGEM did not take this approach in the most recent price review.  
Instead it developed prices for outages and outage duration by taking the target revenue at 
risk and dividing it by a performance band around the target (25% and 30% respectively).  
This approach seems rather arbitrary and yields a fairly wide variation in the effective 
price per outage and the price per minute of outage across distribution companies.  See 
Figure 9.  
OFGEM has also adopted a storm restoration compensation incentive mechanism.   
The distribution companies are given incentives to restore service within a specified time 
period and if they do not they must pay compensation to customers as defined in the 
incentive mechanism.  The mechanism includes adjustments for exceptional events.  
Under normal weather conditions customers are eligible to be paid £50 pounds for an 
interruption that lasts more than 24 hours (£100 for non-domestic) and a further £25 for 
each subsequent 12-hour period.  It is not clear where the values for these payments come 
from.  If a customer consumes 20 kWh per day (600 kWh per month) the implied value 
of lost load is £2.5 per lost kWh or roughly $5000/Mwh of lost energy.  Alternative 
compensation arrangements are applied when there are severe weather conditions.  Both  
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FIGURE 9 
 
OFGEM 2004f 
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FIGURE 10 
 
OFGEM 2004f, p.28 
the triggers and the compensation change.  The trigger periods for compensation are 
defined below and the amount of compensation starts at £25 when the trigger is hit with a 
cap of £200 per customer.  See Figure 10. 
  Finally, there are penalties and rewards for the quality of telephone service.  
These are based on the results of customer surveys. 
 e.  Service Quality Incentives in Massachusetts 
 As price cap mechanisms of one type or another are introduced in the United 
States, quality of service incentives are beginning to get more attention.  The 
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE) has developed and 
applied quality of service performance criteria and incentives to electric distribution 
companies under its jurisdiction (DTE, 2001).  The service quality (SQ) mechanism 
applied to Massachusetts Electric Company is an example.  See Figure 11.  It covers 
frequency and duration of outages as in the UK, five attributes of customer service and 
workplace safety.  The benchmarks are developed based on historical experience and 
penalties and rewards are triggered when actual performance falls outside of one standard 
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deviation of historical performance.  This effectively leads to a “dead-band” around 
historical performance.  There are also caps and floor on the incentive arrangements.  See 
Figure 12. 
FIGURE 11 
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FIGURE 12 
 
   
f.  Electricity Transmission:  Regulation of the National Grid Company (NGC) in 
England and Wales 
 The application of incentive regulation mechanisms to local electricity and gas 
distribution companies, water utilities, and local telephone companies is gaining 
acceptance around the world.  However, these concepts have rarely been applied to the 
owners of electric transmission networks.  The regulation of the National Grid Company 
(NGC) in England and Wales is one of the few examples.13  The regulatory mechanisms 
used to regulate NGC are conceptually similar to those used to regulate the UK 
                                                 
13 Argentina has also applied incentives of various kinds to the owners of the high voltage transmission 
networks in the country (Pollitt 2004). 
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distribution companies.  And, as with the UK distribution companies, the regulatory 
mechanisms have evolved over time as experience has been gained with them and with 
NGC’s performance in response to them. 
When the electricity sector was privatized and restructured in England and Wales 
in 1990, a separate transmission company – the National Grid Company (NGC) -- was 
created to own, maintain, operate and invest in the England and Wales transmission 
network.  It was originally owned by the distribution companies but was spun off as an 
independent company in 1995.  NGC is subject to regulation by OFGEM.  Separate but 
compatible incentive regulation mechanisms are applied to the transmission owner (TO) 
and system operating functions (SO).  These regulatory mechanisms effectively yield 
values for the target revenues NGC is permitted to earn from charges made to generators, 
electricity suppliers and distribution companies for transmission service and system 
operations.  These mechanisms define the aggregate revenues that NGC is allowed to 
earn in each period --- the incentive mechanism defines the average price level for 
transmission service.   
The allowed aggregate revenues determined through the regulatory process are 
then be recovered through a set of prices for the services provided by NGC. Transmission 
customers (generators and retail suppliers) pay NGC for the aggregate operating and 
capital costs allowed for the transmission network defined by the basic incentive 
mechanism pursuant to a regulated tariff. 14  The tariff has two basic components.  The 
first is a “shallow” connection charge that allows NGC to recover the capital 
(depreciation, return on investment, taxes, etc) and operating costs associated with the 
facilities that support each specific interconnection (now using the “Plugs” 
                                                 
14 http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/ click “charging”. 
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methodology).  The second component of the transmission tariff is composed of the 
Transmission Network Use of System Charges (TNUoS). (NGC 2004a,b,c).   The SO 
revenues defined by the SO incentive mechanism are then recovered as surcharges on the 
price of energy delivered to each transmission customer, reflecting variations in these 
charges at different points in time. 
Thus, the general level of charges are set to allow NGC to recover its cost-of-
service based “revenue requirement” or “allowed revenues” as adjusted through the 
incentive regulation mechanism that I will discuss presently.  The structure of the TNUoS 
charges provides for price variation by location on the network based upon (scaled) 
differences in the incremental costs of injecting or receiving electricity at different 
locations as specified in the Investment Cost Related Pricing Methodology.  The 
regulator determines the structure of the charges whose level is adjusted each year to 
yield NGC’s allowed aggregate revenues.  The objective of this pricing mechanism is 
stated to be:  “… efficient economic signals are provided to Users when services are 
priced to reflect the incremental costs of supplying them.  Therefore charges should 
reflect the impact that Users of the transmission system at different locations would have 
on National Grid’s costs, if they are to increase or decrease their use of the system.  
These costs are primarily defined as the investment costs in the transmission system, 
maintenance of the transmission system and maintaining a system capable of providing a 
secure bulk supply of energy.” (NGC 2004a,b,c).  So, for example, generators pay 
significantly higher transmission service costs in the North of England than in the South 
(where the prices may be negative) because there is congestion from North to South and 
“deep” transmission network reinforcements are more likely to be required to 
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accommodate new generation added at various locations in the North but not in the 
South.15  Similarly, load in the South pays more than load in the North because 
transmission enhancements to increase capacity from constrained generation export areas 
benefits customer in the South more than those in the North.   
Unlike the assumption reflected in some of the theoretical work on price cap 
regulation, NGC is not free to adjust the price structure independently.  Indeed, this 
freedom is rarely given to electric transmission and distribution companies subject to 
price cap regulation.  Accordingly, as with the distribution companies in the UK, price 
caps are used primarily as mechanisms to provide incentives for cost reduction by giving 
the regulated firm a budget constraint that (for some time period) is exogenous, not to 
give the firm the freedom to set the optimal price structure.  
Finally, in its role as system operator or SO, NGC has an obligation to balance the 
supply and demand for energy in the system in real time (energy balancing) and to meet 
operating reliability criteria (system balancing).  These costs include the net costs NGC 
incurs to buy and sell power in the balancing market (or through short-term bilateral 
forward contracts) to balance supply and demand at each location, including to manage 
congestion, provide ancillary services, and other actions it must take to meet the 
network’s operating reliability standards, and system losses. These costs are recovered 
from system users through an “uplift” charge based (mediated through an incentive 
regulatory mechanism discussed further below) on the quantities of energy supplied to or 
taken from the network at various points in time. 
                                                 
15 “Deep” transmission network reinforcements refer to reinforcements of the core network that serves large 
groups of generators and demand points as opposed to facilities that connect a single generator or small 
group of generators to the core network. 
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 The regulatory framework for determining the revenues that NGC can recover 
through the Use of System charges and the energy and system balancing charges is based 
on a set of incentive regulation mechanisms that have evolved over time.  The primary 
mechanism covering NGC’s TO costs and charges is a price cap that is developed using 
methods that are similar to those used for the UK electric distribution companies.  This 
mechanism has a cost-of-service base, a performance-based incentive, and a ratchet that 
resets prices from time to time to reflect NGC’s realized or forecast costs.  A base annual 
aggregate “allowed revenue”  for use of system charges is established at the beginning of 
each five year “price review” period (though the latest period is being extended to seven 
years by mutual agreement on NGC and the regulator) in much the same way as for the 
distribution companies discussed above.  As for the distribution companies, the 
accounting for operating costs and capital costs are different.   For capital costs a rate 
base (regulatory assets value or RAV) is defined that is composed of the depreciated 
original cost of existing assets that make up the transmission system inflated to reflect 
inflation since the assets were installed.  The forecast cost of incremental capital 
expenditures budgeted for next five years to meet NGC’s interconnection and system 
security criteria are added to the RAV.  The final capital investment budget is determined 
by OFGEM through a public consultation process and reports by experts retained by 
OFGEM.  Depreciation rates are then applied to the RAV each year to develop a 
depreciation component of the user charge for capital and deducted from the RAV.  A 
real cost of debt and equity capital and a debt/equity ratio are defined and applied to the 
RAV to yield the allowed rate of return component of capital charges for each year of the 
price control period.  The values for allowable O&M expenditures during the future price 
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control period are defined and added to each year’s capital charges (depreciation, allowed 
rate of return on investment, and capital related taxes).  A target rate of productivity 
improvement in operating costs --- the “x” factor --- is included in the forecast of 
allowable real operating costs, or alternatively, the year one allowed operating costs are 
adjusted by the x factor chosen by OFGEM, in addition to the RPI inflation adjustment 
over time. 
  Statistical benchmarking is very difficult for transmission networks.  There is 
only one transmission network in England and Wales.  The composition of a particular 
transmission network depends on many variables, including the distribution of generators 
and load, population density, geographic topography, the attributes and age of the legacy 
network’s components and various environmental constraints affecting siting of new 
lines, transformers and substations.  Comparable cost and performance data are also not 
collected across transmission networks.  Indeed there is no standardization of where the 
transmission network ends and the distribution network begins.  In the UK, the 
transmission network includes network elements that operate at 270kv and above.  In the 
U.S. and France transmission includes network elements that operate above 60kv.  In the 
U.S. there is no systematic collection of data on network performance measures (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2004).  Accordingly, opportunities for relying on 
statistical benchmarking are not yet available and the value of x is determined through a 
regulatory consultation process rather than through statistical benchmarking studies based 
on NGCs forecasts of O&M requirements, wage escalation, and various engineering 
studies of the physical needs of the network and the costs of alternative methods to 
respond to them performed for OFGEM by independent consultants.  Transmission 
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service customers participate in this consultation process as well. (I suppose that the 
phrase “consultation process” sounds better than “rate case,” but they are effectively the 
same animals.)  
 The allowed operating and capital cost values are expressed at the price levels 
prevailing at the time the price review is complete and then are escalated automatically 
during the price control period according to the RPI.   Unbudgeted capital expenditures 
during the price review period can be considered in the next price review, though NGC 
may be at risk for amortization charges during the period between reviews.  
Underspending on capital may also be considered in next price review and adjustments 
made going forward.  After a five year (or longer) period another price review is 
commenced, the starting price is reset to reflect then-prevailing costs, and new 
adjustment parameters defined for the next review period.16  
 As outlined above, in its role as the E&W system operator (SO), NGC is also 
subject to a separate set of incentive regulation mechanisms.  Unlike the price cap 
mechanism used to regulate the level of TO charges, the SO incentive mechanism is 
adjusted each year.  Each year forward targets are established for the costs of system 
balancing services and system losses (OFGEM 2005).  A sharing or sliding scale formula 
is specified which places NGC at risk for a fraction (e.g. 30%) of deviations from this 
benchmark (up or down) with caps on profits and losses.  There is also a cap and a floor.  
Figure 13 displays the attributes of the SO incentive mechanisms in effect since 2001 
when the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) went into operation.  A similar 
incentive regulation mechanism applied to the SO during the late 1990s when the 
                                                 
16 There is also an incentive regulation mechanism that governs network losses that involves annual 
adjustments in the benchmark.  
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previous wholesale power pool was in operation.  This is only the second example that I 
am aware of where the regulated firm was offered a menu of (three) incentive 
arrangements with different sharing fractions and different caps and floors. The most 
recent 3 option menu offered to NGC is displayed in Figure 14.  NGC chose Option 2 
after some adjustments to the target values.  See Figure 15.    
 Until recently, there was no formal incentive mechanism that applied to system 
reliability --- network failures that lead to administrative customer outages or “unsupplied 
energy.”17  OFGEM recently developed and applied a new incentive regulation 
mechanism that applies to severe network outages that lead to customer outages and 
related “unsupplied energy.” (OFGEM 2004h).  This mechanism was developed in 
response to the London blackout during the late summer of 2003. 
 
FIGURE 13 
 
OFGEM 2005 
 
                                                 
17 Transmission networks have quite a bit of redundancy built into them. When specific pieces of 
equipment fail, electricity is naturally rerouted over the rest of the network, and there are no customer 
outages that result.  However, multiple transmission network equipment failures can lead to customer 
outages, though customer outages are most frequently the result of distribution network equipment failures. 
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FIGURE 14 
MENU OF SO INCENTIVE CONTRACTS FOR 2005-06 
 
OFGEM 2005  
FIGURE 15 
FINAL SYSTEM OPERATOR INCENTIVE SCHEME 
2005-06 
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OFGEM 2005 
In 2005, a new incentive mechanism that focuses on the reliability of the 
transmission network as measured by the quantity of “unsupplied energy” resulting from 
transmission network outages went into effect (OFGEM 2004h). This mechanism was 
introduced following the 2003 London blackout.  NGC is assessed penalties or received 
rewards when outages fall outside of a “deadband” of +/- 5% defined by the distribution 
of historical outage experience (and with potential adjustments for extreme weather 
events), using a sliding scale with a cap and a floor on the revenue impact.  This new 
mechanism is displayed in Figures 16 and 17.   The incentive structure is consistent with 
a value of unsupplied energy of £33,000/Mwh, though OFGEM indicated that it did not 
derive the incentive structure from an estimate of the value of lost energy, but rather to 
stimulate managerial attention in what is designed to be an interim incentive mechanism 
(OFGEM 2004h, p.8, 20).  OFGEM argued that it is very difficult to come up with 
accurate measures of the value of lost energy.  Nor does the mechanism provide for 
compensation to customers affected by outages that trigger penalties for the SO (or 
charges for rewards) (p. 20).   The implicit value of unsupplied energy reflected in the 
transmission network incentive mechanism is about an order of magnitude higher that the 
value reflect in the comparable distribution network mechanisms. 
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FIGURE 16 
 
OFGEM 2004h 
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FIGURE 17 
 
 
OFGEM 2004h 
  
 g.  Reflections price cap regulation vs. cost of service regulation in practice 
 This basic price-cap regulatory mechanism used to regulate electricity, gas and 
water distribution and transmission companies in the UK, is often contrasted with 
characterizations of cost-of-service or “cost plus” regulation that developed in the U.S. 
during the 20th century.  However, I believe that there is less difference than may first 
meet the eye.  The UK’s implementation of a price cap based regulatory framework is 
best characterized as a combination of cost-of-service regulation, the application of a 
high powered incentive scheme for operating costs for a fixed period of time, followed by 
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a cost-contingent price ratchet to establish a new starting value for prices.  The inter-
review period is similar to “regulatory lag” in the U.S. context (Joskow 1972, 1974, 
Joskow and Schmalensee 1986) except it is structured around a specific RPI-x formula 
that employs forward looking productivity assessments, allows for automatic adjustments 
for inflation and has a fixed duration.  A considerable amount of regulatory judgment is 
still required by OFGEM.  The regulator must agree to an appropriate level of the starting 
value for “allowable” O&M as well as a reasonable target for improvements in O&M 
productivity during the inter-review period.  The regulator must also review and approve 
investment plans ex ante and make judgments about their reasonableness ex post, though 
investment programs that fall within budgeted values are unlikely to be subject to ex post 
review.  It does this without statistical benchmarking studies which are unavailable.  An 
allowed rate of return must be determined as well as compatible valuations of the rate 
base (capital stock) and depreciation rates.  Cost accounting and cost reporting protocols 
are required to implement sound incentive regulation mechanisms.   
Thus, there are many similarities here with the way cost-of-service regulation 
works in practice in the U.S.   Indeed, perhaps the greatest difference is philosophical.  
OFGEM takes a view which recognizes that by providing performance-based incentives 
for regulated utilities to reduce costs, it can yield consumer benefits in the long run by 
making it profitable for the firm to make efficiency improvements.  If the firm over 
performs against the target, consumers eventually benefit at the next price review.  It has 
generally (though not always) been willing to allow the regulated firms to earn 
significantly higher returns than their cost of capital when these returns are achieved from 
cost savings beyond the benchmark, knowing that the next “ratchet” will convey these 
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benefits to consumers.18   Under traditional U.S. regulation, the provision of incentives 
through regulatory lag is more a consequence of the impracticality of frequent price 
reviews and changing economic conditions than by design. 
 
PERFORMANCE OF INCENTIVE REGULATION MECHANISMS FOR  
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION NETWORK 
 
 There are been relatively little systematic analysis of the effects of the application 
of incentive regulation mechanisms on the performance of electric distribution and 
transmission companies.19  Privatization, restructuring and the application of high-
powered regulatory mechanisms has led to improvements in labor productivity and 
service quality in electric distribution systems in England and Wales, Argentina, Chile, 
Brazil, Peru, New Zealand and other countries (Newbery and Pollitt 1997, Rudnick and 
Zolezzi 2001, Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001, Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 1998, 
Pollitt (2004)).  Sectors that had experienced physical distribution losses due to poor 
maintenance and antiquated equipment, as well as resulting from thefts of electric 
service, have generally experienced significant reductions in both types of losses.  
Penetration rates for the availability of electricity to the population have increased in 
those countries where service was not already universally available and queues for 
connections have been shortened.  Distribution and transmission network outages have 
declined.  Improved performance of regulated distribution (and sometimes transmission) 
systems has accompanied privatization and the application of high-powered PBR 
                                                 
18 There is an least one problem with the fixed ratchet period.  A dollar (or Pound Sterling) of cost savings 
in year 1 is worth much more to the firm than a dollar of cost savings in year 5.  OFGEM recently adopted 
policies to equalize the returns from cost saving during the inter-review period. 
 
19 There is a much more extensive body of empirical work that examines the effects of incentive regulation 
mechanisms, primarily price caps, on the performance of telecommunications firms.  For example, Ai and 
Sappington 2002, Sappington 2003, and Ai, Martinez and Sappington 2004.  
 73
mechanisms almost everywhere it has been implemented.  Most of these studies have 
focused on developing countries where the pre-reform levels of performance was 
especially poor.  Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of privatization, 
restructuring and incentive regulation from one another. 
 The most comprehensive study of the post reform performance of the regional 
electricity distribution companies in the UK (distribution and supply functions) has been 
done by Domah and Pollitt (2001).  They find significant overall increases in productivity 
over the period 1990 to 2000 and lower real “controllable” distribution costs compared to 
a number of benchmarks.  See Figure 18.  However, controllable costs and overall prices 
first rose in the early years of the reforms before falling dramatically after 1995. The first 
application 
 
FIGURE 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Domah and Pollitt (2001), p. 21 
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of price cap mechanisms to the RECs  in 1990 was too generous (average of  RPI+ 2.5%) 
and a lot of rent were left on the table for the REC’s initial owners (who cleverly soon 
sold out to foreign buyers).  Subsequent price cap mechanisms place much more cost 
pressure on the RECs and it resulted in large increases in realized productivity and falling 
distribution charges.  In the price control period starting in 2005, productivity 
improvements in operating costs are built into the price cap mechanism (OFGEM 2004f).  
However, a 50% average increase in allowed capital expenditures over the 5-year price 
control period is also reflected in the level of allowed prices and real overall prices will 
rise as overage as a result over the 5-year price control period.  The increased capital 
expenditures are needed to replace aging equipment, to meet growing demand, and to 
support improvements in reliability.  The interaction of operating cost accounting, capital 
cost accounting, cyclical investment requirements, and service quality indicia implies that 
total “regulatory” cost changes per se are not likely to be an good indicator of 
productivity changes or relative performance. 
 Bertram and Twaddle (2005) provide an interesting analysis of the combined 
effects on the prices charged for distribution service resulting from capital asset valuation 
decisions and the impacts of price cap-type regulation on the operating costs of 
distribution networks.  When sector restructuring takes place one decision that must be 
made is how to value the assets of the distribution and transmission companies that will 
be used for regulatory purposes going forward.  The typical approach has been to carry 
forward the existing depreciated book value of historical investments in transmission and 
distribution into the new regime so that the base level of distribution and transmission 
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charges associated with the recovery of capital-related charges does not change as a 
consequence of the transition.  Incremental investments are then accounted for more or 
less as they were under the old regime (as in the U.S. and Canada) or economic/inflation 
accounting methods and approximations to economic depreciation applied (as in the UK).  
These decisions are further complicated in countries where the industry was state-owned 
and did not employ rigorous capital cost accounting protocols or where prices were kept 
so low as to not even cover the carrying charges on plant and equipment. 
Bertram and Twaddle (2005) review the impact of decisions made in New 
Zealand to “write up” the value of distribution company assets to reflect their “true” 
economic value (something like depreciated replacement cost new).  These asset values 
were then used to set the price levels within a price cap regulatory framework. The 
argument for doing so was that this would allow prices to rise to their efficient level and 
provide consumers with appropriate price signals.  The arguments against this revaluation 
were that (a) it would lead to significant price increases, (b) non-linear pricing could be 
used to restore the correct price incentives on the margin, and (c) it created windfall 
profits for distribution network owners and undermine support for restructuring and 
competition. 
Bertram and Twaddle focus on the effects of this asset revaluation program on 
distribution service price levels in New Zealand.  Prices and price-operating cost margins 
rose significantly.  However, their work also demonstrates that operating costs incurred 
by distribution companies in New Zealand fell very significantly during the same period 
of time.  These cost savings appear to reflect both the consolidation of many small 
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distribution companies through mergers and the incentives for cost reduction provided by 
a high-power incentive scheme.  See Figure 19. 
FIGURE 19 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK  PRICES AND COSTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Bertram and Twaddle (2005) 
 
Distribution service quality, at least as measured by supply interruptions per 100 
customers and average minutes of service lost per customer, has improved as well in the 
UK since the restructuring and privatization initiative in 1990.  This suggests that 
incentive regulation has not led, as some had feared, to a degradation in these dimensions 
of service quality.  See Figure 20. 
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FIGURE 20 
 
Let me conclude with a few observations on the performance of the incentive 
regulation mechanisms that have been applied to NGC by OFGEM for almost a decade.  
When the new E&W industry structure and market arrangements were implemented in 
1990, the system naturally started with a legacy network and configuration of generating 
capacity. Substantial entry of new generating capacity and retirements of old generating 
capacity followed, with major changes in power flows over the legacy network.  During 
the initial years of operation there was no incentive regulation mechanism governing 
system operating costs, including the costs of managing congestion and other network 
constraints.  NGC’s SO costs escalated rapidly growing from about $75 million per year 
in 1990/91 to almost $400 million per year in 1993/94.  After the introduction of the SO 
incentive scheme in 1994, these costs fell to about $25 million in 1999/2000.  OFGEM 
estimates that NGC’s system operating costs fell by about £400 million between 1994 
and 2001 (OFGEM, April 2004).  Overall costs of transmission service, including 
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operating, system balancing (which includes congestion costs), use of system, and 
connection charges fell by about 50% between 1994 and 2001.  See Figure 21.   NGC’s 
loss rate has also declined over time.  A new SO incentive scheme was introduced when 
NETA went into operation in early 2001.    NGC’s SO costs have fallen by nearly 20% 
over the three year period since the new scheme was introduced (OFGEM, December 
2003).     
FIGURE 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NGC 
The organizational and regulatory arrangements that characterize the system in 
England and Wales are generally viewed to have been quite successful in supporting 
competitive wholesale and retail power markets with a transmission system that has 
attractive operating and investment results. During the period, demand grew, about 
25,000 Mw of new generating capacity entered the system, and almost an equal amount 
was retired.  Power flows changed significantly on the network.  While network 
investment is cyclical, following cycles of generation additions and retirements, intra-
control area investment post-restructuring has increased significantly compared to intra-
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control area investment pre-restructuring (Figure 22), while congestion costs have 
declined significantly since 1994.  Network losses have declined and system reliability 
has been maintained.  A more formal assessment of performance is difficult because it 
very challenging to define a counterfactual for comparison purposes.   
FIGURE 22 
 
Source: NGC 
 
DISCUSSION 
 During the last fifteen years the theoretical foundations for incentive regulation of 
legal monopolies has developed considerably and now provides a reasonably mature 
theoretical framework for designing incentive regulatory mechanisms for practical 
application.  However, the application of these concepts to electric distribution and 
transmission networks has lagged considerably behind these theoretical developments for 
a variety of reasons.  Incentive regulation in practice is considerably more complicated 
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than incentive regulation in theory.  I offer the following observations about the 
relationship between theory and practice.  
1.  Incentive regulation has been promoted as a straightforward and superior 
alternative to traditional cost of service or rate of return regulation.  In practice, incentive 
regulation is more a complement to than a substitute for traditional approaches to 
regulating legal monopolies.  In some ways it is more challenging.  Whether the extra 
effort is worth it depends on whether the performance improvements justify the 
additional effort.  Incentive regulation in practice requires a good accounting system for 
capital and operating costs, cost reporting protocols, data collection and reporting 
requirements for dimensions of performance other than costs.  Capital cost accounting 
rules are necessary, a rate base for capital must still be defined, depreciation rates 
specified, and an allowed rate of return on capital determined.  There are still 
comprehensive rate cases required to implement “simple” price cap mechanisms.  
Planning processes for determining needed capital additions are an important part of the 
process of setting total allowed revenues going forward.  Performance benchmarks must 
be defined and the power of the relevant incentive mechanisms determined.  The 
information burden to implement incentive regulation mechanisms well is similar to that 
for traditional cost of service regulation.   
What distinguishes incentive regulation in practice from traditional cost of service 
regulation is that this information is used more effectively, looking forward rather than 
backward, and recognizing that regulators have imperfect and asymmetric information 
that makes the use of regulatory mechanisms that clearly recognize the associated adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems and are designed to mitigate them.  The proof of the 
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pudding must ultimately lie in analyses of the performance of alternative regulatory 
mechanisms.  More work needs to be done on the performance of incentive regulation 
mechanisms applied to electric distribution and transmission system. 
2.  Incentive regulation in practice is clearly an evolutionary process.  One set of 
mechanisms is tried, their performance assessed, additional data and reporting needs 
identified, and refined mechanisms developed and applied.  This type of evolutionary 
process seems to me to be inevitable.  However, to the extent that changes in regulatory 
mechanisms are contingent on past performance, this kind of evolutionary process raises 
credibility issues and may lead to strategic behavior of firms that are playing a repeated 
game with their regulators.  Theoretical work that more accurately captures these 
adaptation properties of incentive regulation in practice would be desirable. 
3.  Price cap mechanisms are the most popular form of incentive regulation used 
around the world, in part because this mechanism has been heavily advertised as being 
simple alternative to cost of service regulation.  There is a lot of loose and misleading 
talk about the application of price caps in practice.  From a theoretical perspective the 
infatuation with price caps as incentive devices is surprising since price caps are almost 
never the optimal solution to the tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction when 
there are firm budget or viability constraints and raise service quality issues.  However, 
price caps in practice are not like “forever” price caps in theory.  There are ratchets every 
few years which reduce the power of the incentive scheme and make it easier to deal with 
excessive or inadequate rents left to the firm.  They are not so simple to implement 
because defining the relevant capital and operating costs and associated benchmarks is 
challenging.  Price caps are also typically (eventually) accompanied by other incentive 
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mechanisms to respond to concerns about service quality.  Evaluating their performance 
without taking account of the other incentive mechanisms in place can lead to misleading 
results.  Effective implementation of a good price cap mechanism with periodic ratchets 
requires many of the same types of accounting, auditing, capital service, and cost of 
capital measurement protocols as does cost of service regulation.  Capital cost accounting 
and investment issues have received embarrassingly little attention in both the theoretical 
literature and applied work on price caps and related incentive mechanisms, especially 
the work related to benchmarking applied to the construction of price cap mechanisms. 
Proceeding with price caps without this regulatory information infrastructure and an 
understanding of benchmarking and the treatment of capital costs, as has been the case in 
many developing countries following guidance from World Bank regulatory gurus, can 
lead to serious performance problems. 
4.  In practical applications to electric distribution and transmission networks 
there is an implicit assumption that there is a dichotomy between incentives contracts 
(aggregate revenue targets) and price setting (price structures).  This dichotomy between 
the firm’s budget or allowed revenues and its price structure is consistent with the 
historical development of regulatory practice in the U.S. where rate cases separate the 
determination of allowed revenues or revenue requirements from the specification of 
price structures that yield the indicated revenues.  A similar dichotomy has been adopted 
in the regulatory process in the UK.  Regulated firms are given little flexibility to adjust 
price structures under the price cap mechanism.  Accordingly, the primary role of price 
caps is to provide incentives for cost reduction not to provide firms with the incentive to 
set optimal second-best prices given their overall budget constraints.  The evaluations of 
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the performance of price cap regulation should therefore be evaluated from the 
perspective of the effects on performance incentives not on its effects on price structures 
since these are typically not chosen voluntarily by the regulated firm but are subject to 
independent regulatory determinations. 
5.  Incentive regulation theory implies that the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems resulting from the regulators’ information disadvantages are best handled by 
offering firms a menu of cost contingent incentive contracts.  Formal offers of menus are 
rare, though the give and take of regulatory negotiations may be a substitute.  OFGEM’s 
recent use of a menu of sliding scale schemes to deal with differences over capital 
investment forecasts for electric distribution companies seems to me to be an especially 
effective approach and, indeed, led the regulated firms to make more “reasonable” 
investment proposals, at least according to OFGEM.  More frequent use of menus of 
incentive contracts in this way could improve incentive regulation in practice. 
6.  Collection of data on all relevant and significant measures of firm performance 
and the use of these data for benchmarking purposes and for developing performance 
targets is an important component of good incentive regulation in practice.  Regulators 
need the authority to require firms to collect performance data, to audit performance data 
and to analyze these data.  Absent these authorities and resources incentive regulation 
mechanisms will not achieve their promise in practice. 
7.   As incentive regulation has evolved in the UK and other countries, the 
portfolio of incentive mechanisms that is being utilized has grown.  While the initial 
focus was on reducing operating costs it has now shifted to investment and various 
dimensions of service quality.  Ideally these mechanisms should be fully integrated and 
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differences in the power of the individual incentive schemes carefully considered.  As 
things stand now there appear to be differences in the power of the incentives schemes as 
they relate to capital and operating costs.  These problems are exacerbated in the UK and 
many other countries new to formal regulation by the lack of uniform systems of 
accounts and reporting requirements.   Quality of service schemes appear to have been 
bolted on to schemes designed to provide incentives for cost reduction and do not 
effectively incorporate information on consumer valuations of quality and the costs of 
varying quality in different dimensions.  While the value of lost or unsupplied energy is 
uncertain, it is better to use an imperfect estimate of the right number than a highly 
accurate estimate of the wrong number.  Efforts need to be made to harmonize these 
schemes and to guard against distortions caused by differences in the effective power of 
the constituent components of the overall incentive mechanisms. 
8.  Incentive regulation mechanisms often have “deadbands,” caps, and floors that 
place limits on the performance realizations for which the regulated firm is at risk.   At 
first blush, the use of hard caps and floors on the realizations of sliding scale mechanisms 
that place kinks in the incentive structure are hard to rationalize from a theoretical 
perspective and appear to have poor incentive properties for realizations near to the kinks 
in the incentive contract.  Caps and floors may be justified as reflecting outcomes that 
were not contemplated (bounded rationality) in the level and structure of the target 
performance norms and the distribution of profits around these targets.  They effectively 
trigger renegotiation.  However, it is likely that a multipart sliding scale structure that 
softens incentives as the cap and floor are approaches would have superior efficiency 
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properties.  We need to better understand the popular use of hard caps and floors and try 
to better understand their efficiency properties. 
9.  Our ability to use incentive regulation mechanisms effectively is dependent on 
the attributes of the restructuring and liberalization program of which it is part.  For 
example, it is much easier to develop and apply an incentive regulation program to the 
electric transmission system in England and Wales because there is one vertically 
integrated transmission owner and system operator.  The balkanized ownership structure 
of transmission assets in the U.S., combined with the separation of system operating 
functions (to non-profit independent system operators) from transmission ownership, 
maintenance, physical operation and investment, makes the application of incentive 
regulation mechanisms (indeed any effective regulation mechanism) a very significant 
challenge.  The difficulties are enhanced by the peculiar mix of federal and state 
regulation of transmission in the U.S. and the failure of the federal regulator to take an 
active role in defining performance attributes, collecting performance data and 
developing performance norms. FERC Order 2000 effectively assigns these 
responsibilities to RTO/ISO entities, but they have not taken up this challenge to date 
(Joskow 2005b). 
10.  We need to pursue more work on the performance of incentive regulation 
mechanisms on electric and gas distribution and transmission companies in all relevant 
dimensions.  The empirical research on the performance of incentive regulation in the 
telecommunications sector is much more extensive than is the research on electricity and 
gas networks.  This kind of comparative institutional work is not easy, but it needs to be 
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done, perhaps in conjunction with benchmarking studies that include firms subject to 
different types of regulation. 
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